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Social disinvestment: the limits of tightening eligibility

Key announcements from Budget 2026

On top of the previously announced social housing changes discussed in our article, Budget 2026 invests a further $69.2 million into the Flexible Housing Fund to deliver between 1800 and 2250 additional social homes over three years starting from 2028/29.

Our pre-Budget perspectives

As Budget 2026 approaches, the Government is signalling a shift towards fiscal constraint, tighter prioritisation, and a more targeted approach to social assistance. For a country with New Zealand’s tax base, targeted support has long been a more viable foundation than universal provision. Even systems that appear universal, such as health, are ultimately rationed in practice.

The challenge is not whether to target, but how targeting is applied and what sits alongside it.

The original premise of social investment was not simply about allocating scarce resources more precisely – it was about reducing future demand for those resources. A rationed system cannot rely solely on better targeting of current need; it must actively reshape the demand curve over time. The evidence on this point is consistent: early intervention and prevention are the most effective levers for reducing long-term fiscal pressure and improving outcomes.

Without that focus, targeting becomes an increasingly tight loop. Demand persists while support narrows. This is not a stable equilibrium; it simply shifts pressure within the system.

The announced changes to social housing assistance illustrate this tension. New Zealand is facing sustained excess demand for social housing, and a more rationed approach may manage that pressure in the short term, but the longer-term effects require careful consideration.

Where demand remains high, tightening eligibility risks shifting costs rather than reducing them. In this scenario, the policy effectively transfers support from those in social housing to a larger group of low-income private renters, with little net reduction in overall system pressure.

New Zealand’s housing problem is, at its core, simple: not enough homes are being built to keep up with demand. This is a long-term, structural issue. Against this backdrop, the recent changes to social housing assistance are best understood as a reallocation of demand rather than a solution to the supply shortage, creating a risk of increased price pressures.

The changes affect households in different ways. Social housing tenants will face higher rents, reducing disposable income for around 84,000 households by about $31 per week on average. At the same time, increases in the Accommodation Supplement will boost support for around 110,000 households in the private rental market by roughly $10 to $30 per week. However, a reduction in Temporary Additional Support means that, overall, households receiving housing assistance may be slightly worse off on average.

Rather than easing pressure in the system, the changes shift where that pressure sits. More households may move into subsidised private rentals, while social housing will remain full, with a waitlist of close to 20,000 applicants. Overall demand for affordable housing is unlikely to change.

There’s also a risk of flow-on effects in the rental market. As more households receive support in the private rental sector – and some receive more support than before – this could put upward pressure on rents, particularly in already tight markets. That said, the scale of this effect is uncertain and may not materially change overall rent levels.

The impact on government spending is not entirely clear. One part of the reform is expected to reduce spending by around $208.8 million over the forecast period, but the effects of the other changes have not been specified. Overall, the direction of the package suggests an effort to contain costs, though the net fiscal impact remains uncertain.

There is also a question of resilience. As highlighted in Deloitte’s State of the State research1, household resilience is about the capacity to absorb and adapt to shocks without compromising long-term wellbeing.

Relatively small reductions in disposable income or increases in unavoidable costs can materially impact that resilience, particularly for lower-income households with limited financial buffers. Many households already operate with thin margins and are exposed to income volatility, meaning policies that weaken short-term financial positions can have disproportionate long-term effects on wellbeing and fiscal outcomes.

Household financial resilience, particularly among low-income families, is a critical determinant of long-term independence. Even a relatively small buffer can enable households to absorb shocks and avoid falling into more acute and sustained reliance on support. When that buffer is eroded, the likelihood of repeated hardship increases, along with the intensity and duration of support required.

In this context, increasing rental contributions required by social housing tenants and tightening Temporary Additional Support risks increasing the likelihood and persistence of future demand for government support, rather than reducing it over time.

Coupled with shorter tenures, this creates broader social and economic costs in both the short and long term. Families who move homes may need to move jobs and schools – and consistent school attendance is a significant predictor of long-term outcomes. Access to ECE and needing to re-enter ECE waitlists due to relocation can be a material barrier to parents’ ability to work.

This creates an inconsistency. On one hand, there’s a move towards defining social housing as a shorter-term intervention. On the other, changes that reduce financial resilience make it harder for households to stabilise and exit support successfully. These forces operate in opposite directions.

It’s true that households in similar circumstances currently receive different levels of assistance, and greater consistency is a reasonable policy objective. But spreading the same level of resource more thinly does not address the underlying supply-demand imbalance. It simply redistributes pressure – concentrated among households at the most insecure end of the housing continuum, where affordability constraints leave less income available for essentials such as food and fuel.

Over the medium to long term, the fundamentals remain unchanged. Sustainable improvement requires both an expansion in supply – including housing, employment, and economic opportunity – and a deliberate reduction in long-term demand through investment in wellbeing and resilience. These concepts may be dismissed as abstract or unfashionable, but they remain central to the economics of the system.

Ultimately, this is not a question of generosity or restraint. It’s a question of whether policy settings are aligned to reduce long-term demand, or whether they rely on increasingly tight rationing of a system under continued pressure. Targeting has a role to play, but it cannot, on its own, be our approach to winning the long game.

Endnote
1Deloitte State of the State report, 2017

Budget 2026: The long game

The New Zealand Government’s 2026 Budget was delivered on 28 May. Explore analysis and perspectives from our experts, and our Budget at a glance infographic. 

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