The PRA’s Dynamic General Insurance Stress Test (DyGIST) was a live, three-week exercise held in May, during which insurers responded to a sequence of severe but plausible events. The shocks included a cyber attack, a market downturn, and reinsurance and natural catastrophe (NatCat) events. DyGIST assessed market-wide solvency and liquidity resilience, firms’ risk management and management actions, and the PRA’s potential supervisory response during a live crisis.
Over the summer, we interviewed and gathered data from a sample of DyGIST participants. We received input from 11 DyGIST participants across the general insurance sector, as well as thematic feedback from 3 trade associations representing a large share of the insurance market, to provide an early view of market sentiment towards this new exercise.
Key takeaways from the survey
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According to respondents, the individual DyGIST events were broadly comparable with severe real-world shocks. However, participants questioned the plausibility of five major events occurring in such quick succession. The main feedback was that the greatest test was not any single event, but the cumulative pressure created by the sequence.
Looking at the events in more detail, the market downturn and UK windstorm Nevis were viewed as particularly significant. Nevis affected many respondents because of both its UK footprint and the fact that it happened in the second inject of shocks. By the time Nevis occurred, some firms had already used a substantial amount of reinsurance capacity in response to earlier events.
The market downturn was also significant from a solvency perspective. In addition, operationally, it required firms to review large volumes of both historical and current data because the shock was assumed to have begun in March 2026 (i.e., three months before the start of the live exercise).
Respondents were well-equipped to face the demanding sequence of events from DyGIST thanks to their preparation. Half of respondents had completed a simulation or dry run, while around 4 respondents had taken several preparatory steps, such as committee structure reviews to pre-identify the chain of escalation, stakeholder engagement or early discussions with third parties. Only one in ten firms reported having done very limited preparation.
This preparation translated directly into effective execution. Pre-assigned roles (including dedicated DyGist project management), established data pathways, resource planning within specialist teams and clear committee structures helped firms mobilise cross-functional teams and produce timely loss estimates. Firms commonly identified internal coordination and modelling as strengths, even though the teams involved worked under significant pressure throughout the exercise.
Despite this preparation, DyGIST exposed several operational pressure points. Reinsurance teams had to make assumptions without real-time market insight, while repeated updates to the solvency capital requirement (SCR) and capital coverage positions increased the workload for modelling teams and those approving loss assumptions. Specialists in capital modelling and exposure management sometimes faced sustained pressure, highlighting key-person risk in some firms. For example, the repeated shocks generated many requests to review reinsurance arrangements, placing significant pressure on the small number of specialists responsible for modelling reinstatement assumptions.
To mitigate the impact of the shocks, respondents cited parent or group capital injections as the main management action. They also mentioned additional reinsurance and premium-rate adjustments.
Although most respondents (~90%) reported limited or no new business learning from DyGIST, it also highlighted operational areas for improvement.
For many respondents, the next steps identified involved:
During qualitative interviews, some firms also mentioned improving data readiness or rehearsing parts of the exercise again. For example, one firm plans to re-run the cyber scenario internally because the information collected from DyGIST were useful to enhance elements of the firm’s capital and risk framework. Whilst many firms are better used to NatCat stress testing, the cyber-related stress shock provided new insights into some firms exposure and risk management.
Overall, firms were satisfied with how the DyGIST process was run. Some noted that regulatory challenge during the weekly calls might have been more detailed and quantitative than expected and is likely to be more resource intensive than originally envisaged.
Overall, the first DyGIST was a test of execution rather than a source of strategic surprises. Firms with clear governance pathways, access to robust data and sufficient specialist capacity were better placed to respond quickly and make well-supported decisions.
These findings reflect survey responses received as of 07 September 2026. The final aggregate results may evolve as further responses are received.