At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and change, EU Policymakers are increasingly concerned about dependencies on critical technologies from third countries, and the impact that this might have on the EU’s digital economy and resilience.
Indeed, this concern is starkly evidenced by a statistic included in the European Commission’s new Tech Sovereignty Package – that despite the EU market for cloud computing services growing significantly, the market share of EU providers decreased from 29% in 2017 to 15% in 2022 and “has remained stagnant since then”.
The Commission is also concerned that even though there are numerous cloud computing services in the EU marketed with sovereignty in mind, these services “do not address the core sovereignty issues allowing for the extra-territorial reach of third-country laws and the possible degradation or disruption of the service”.
The new package of measures has therefore been eagerly awaited, with many expecting it would provide a definitive view of the most pressing (and challenging) questions that are being raised in the market, such as:
Whether the proposed new measures are perceived as going too far, or not far enough, will likely depend on the market position, and nationality, of the organisation in question. The proposed new rules will have particular relevance to the following:
Taken as a whole, the proposed new sovereignty framework represents vital reading for the companies and public sector bodies who may be affected, either directly or indirectly, by its contents.
The new package is multifaceted, containing two new legislative proposals, a strategic roadmap (essentially, how the Commission plans to achieve a political and industrial goal) and a Communication (essentially, a non-binding policy paper).
The four distinct elements of the new package are set out in Figure 1 below.
The European Commission is performing something of a balancing act with the new package, as illustrated by the Tech Sovereignty Communication that forms part of it.
It is clear from the new communication that tech sovereignty is a two-sided coin.
On the one side, representing “Europe’s ability to develop, control and scale the critical technologies, infrastructure, services and data, including digital ecosystems, that underpin its economy, security and society, while derisking and diversifying supply chains and technological exposure to reduce strategic dependencies and resist foreign interference”.
While on the other, being “grounded in openness, partnership and fair competition. It does not mean isolation, protectionism, or tech decoupling.”
There is no single, succinct regulatory definition of tech sovereignty contained in the new package. Instead, it proposes a new EU-wide sovereignty framework. This is what we will now focus on for the remainder of this article.
The proposed sovereignty framework is included as part of the new Cloud and AI Development Act (‘CADA’). It contains four different levels of assurance, with numerous criteria in respect of each which can be used to demonstrate conformity.
The framework applies to the provision of a cloud computing service, consistent with the definition in the previous NIS2 Directive, i.e. “a digital service that enables on-demand administration and broad remote access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources, including where such resources are distributed across several locations”. The recitals to the CADA are clear that this includes on-demand access to AI systems (as defined in the AI Act). Therefore, only the delivery and making available of the AI System forms part of this cloud computing service (i.e. the AI system itself and its underlying model are not within scope).
From a customer perspective, it is important to note that the immediate focus of the new sovereignty framework is on cloud computing services procured by public sector bodies. However, the CADA highlights the possibility of applying it to cloud service procurement by private sector companies in sectors of high criticality in the future.
Another notable element of the new framework is that it contains provisions which enable third country regimes to be found to provide comparable levels of protection to that which exists in the EU. Broadly speaking, the Commission may determine (via secondary regulation) third countries whose regimes are seen as being compatible with assurance level 3. To be determined as such, a series of cumulative tests need to be met, one of which is that the country’s regime is subject to a relevant adequacy decision under the GDPR. Other tests include that the third country has no measures in place to compel the cloud computing service provider to degrade or disrupt service continuity or provision, and that it maintains an open market to EU cloud computing services.
An overview of the new framework is set out in Figure 2 below. This outlines the four levels of cloud sovereignty that have been proposed in the CADA, illustrating each level by reference to one of the key criteria relevant to a conformity assessment (in this case, third-country control over provider and subcontractors).
The new framework has material implications and/or potential implications for three distinct entities, namely cloud computing service providers, public sector bodies and private sector companies in sectors of high criticality.
Cloud providers
It is envisaged that cloud computing providers seeking to provide services to public sector bodies in the EU review their activities against the specific criteria associated with each assurance level. The criteria become more stringent the higher the level of assurance (taking just one example, self-assessment is acceptable for assurance level 1, whereas an independent audit is required to demonstrate compliance with assurance levels 2, 3 and 4). Member States are required to designate national authorities responsible for recognising the auditing procedure and framework and the supervision of cloud providers going forward.
Public sector bodies
Public sector entities in the EU should carry out risk assessments (one year after entry into force of the CADA, and every two years, or whenever necessary, after that) to determine which assurance level is required for its activities (with the Commission expected to provide guidance in this area). The public body is also expected to consider whether a multi-vendor or multi-cloud strategy is appropriate, based on any relevant operational, regulatory or resilience-related circumstances.
Private sector companies in sectors of high criticality
The CADA is also clear that private sector entities in critical sectors (as identified in Annex I of the NIS2 Directive) may voluntarily carry out similar assessments in relation to their procurement of cloud computing services, and that if required, the Commission may adopt delegated acts specifying the need for such assessments in the future. Therefore, companies in sectors such as energy, transport, banking, financial services infrastructures, health and digital infrastructures should also have this on their radar.
In Figure 3 below, we set out three high-level examples of how the new sovereignty framework would apply and/or potentially apply to each of these three different entities.
The new sovereignty framework underscores the importance of affected organisations pro-actively responding to the evolving EU sovereignty landscape. The different organisations affected by it will obviously need to respond to it in different ways
The text will now be negotiated by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, meaning that further amendments are still to be expected. Once finalised, a one-year implementation period will follow.
In the meantime, organisations that effectively map their activities against this emerging, more detailed definition of sovereignty, and respond in an agile way to developments in the external environment, will be well placed to stay ahead of the curve.