First, a quick primer: When investors purchase a security—such as a corporate bond, a government bond, or a collateralized debt obligation—they often want to purchase insurance against the possibility of default. They purchase such kinds of insurance in the form of CDSs, which are derivative products usually sold by financial institutions. The price of a CDS reflects the perceived risk of default.
Currently, the notional value of the market for CDSs issued by a single debtor is about US$9 trillion. CDSs are quoted in the form of a spread priced in basis points. Currently, an index of CDSs for investment-grade corporate bonds is trading at 53 basis points.
Lately, the prices of CDSs issued by many tech companies have risen sharply. Tech companies, many of which are flush with historically high levels of cash, are investing so much in artificial intelligence that they’ve chosen to go to the bond market for financing. As this has taken place, and as perceived risks have increased, the cost of these CDSs has also risen.
There are several potential explanations for the rise in CDS prices. First, there is increasing concern about tech companies’ ability to generate sufficient cash to cover debt-servicing costs. A major tech company reported its first quarter of negative free cash flow since it went public two decades ago. Moreover, bond yields have risen, and further tightening of monetary policy could push them higher, increasing the cost of servicing debts.
Meanwhile, the sharp decline in the equity prices of semiconductor companies could be a signal that investors are concerned about a sharp slowdown in the buildout of AI capacity, which, in turn, could reflect concerns about excess capacity.
Second, there is increasing concern in the United States about competition from AI companies in China. The selloff of tech shares this week was, in part, attributed to concerns about the rise of Chinese AI companies. Many can offer good-quality AI services at relatively low prices. The challenge for US-based AI companies is that the massive investments they are making as first-movers could be undermined by cheaper second-movers—in this case, Chinese companies.
Third, Nikkei Asia reported that the volume of off–balance sheet debt incurred by big tech companies is now significantly large: Off–balance sheet debt had quadrupled in the past four years at five major US-based tech companies, hitting US$1.65 trillion. This is greater than the volume of debt appearing on their balance sheets.
Finally, there is increasing concern about so-called “circular financing.” An example would be where a semiconductor company provides funding to an AI company to build tech capacity. In return, the AI company purchases the semiconductor company’s chips. The main concern with this arrangement is that, if the AI company is unable to generate strong cash flow, it becomes not only a concern for the AI company but also for the semiconductor company. This is reminiscent of the dot-com bubble 26 years ago when telecom companies invested in internet companies that were buying telecom equipment. When the internet companies had issues, so did the telecom companies.
“Technological breakthroughs are typically accompanied by investment booms and buoyant macroeconomic activity. Exuberance about the promise of new technologies intensifies competition among firms eager to capture a share of the revenues. The race to get ahead can result in excessive investment that makes the boom unsustainable and prone to a disruptive ending. This fragility is further aggravated by the leverage that accompanies the rapid ramp-up of investment. This boom-bust pattern recurs across history, from the US canal mania in the 1830s and the British railway mania in the 1840s, to the roaring ’20s, and the dot-com boom in the late ’90s. These episodes all ended in sharp corrections, with wider economic fallout.”
The Bank for International Settlements goes on to note the massive scale of investment taking place. It said that “the potential demand for AI services is clearly vast and could justify a substantial expansion in computational power. Yet, relative to its pre-boom trough, the current build-out is on track to outgrow every previous episode only three years in.” It also said that the huge increase in leverage to finance the buildout, along with a lot of circular financing, has increased the risk of potential troubles on the road ahead.
To better understand what could happen, the Bank for International Settlements developed a simple theoretical model, in which, numerous AI firms compete in a “winner take most” environment. With most of the reward from the investment accruing to a small number of players, the end result is excess capacity. Ultimately, “an AI boom creates fragility that undermines itself. The more capacity the sector builds, the higher the productivity bar it must clear to sustain the boom, so a larger boom is both more likely to disappoint and more damaging when it does.” The Bank for International Settlements concluded that “the larger the boom, the deeper the eventual bust. The race to commit early through debt and circular financing also makes a bust more likely.”
There are three important things to note about this analysis. First, it does not imply that a debilitating correction is likely. It simply implies that such an outcome is a realistic possibility. Second, even if a correction is likely, it is impossible to estimate the timing. That is, in past episodes, naysayers accurately predicted doom only to find that the doom came much later than anticipated. A boom can go on for a prolonged period before trouble emerges. Third, even if a correction comes, it does not imply that the investments made were foolhardy. It simply implies that the path toward a revolutionary change is not a straight line. There was a sharp correction during the dot-com bubble. It did not mean that investment in the then burgeoning internet was wrong. After all, the internet eventually changed everything—which will probably be true for AI, as well. But along the path to that idyllic future, there could be tears.
On July 29, 2026, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee announced that the benchmark interest rate will remain unchanged. The 12-member committee voted 9-to-3 to keep the rate unchanged, with three members voting to boost the rate by 25 basis points. The committee commented that “economic activity is expanding at a solid pace despite elevated uncertainty that owes, in part, to the conflict in the Middle East. Productivity growth and capital investment are strong. Job gains have kept pace with the workforce, and the unemployment rate has changed little. Inflation remains elevated relative to the committee’s 2% goal, in part reflecting supply shocks that have driven price increases in certain sectors, including energy. The committee will deliver price stability.”
In his press conference, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh reiterated that the Fed intends to maintain the 2% target for inflation, which he deemed the definition of price stability. Moreover, he said he wants to anchor investor expectations, that is, he wants to convince investors that the Fed intends to maintain the 2% target. Warsh also said that, if inflation remains elevated, interest rates could be “part of the equation” for the Fed in targeting lower inflation. However, Warsh was repeatedly asked by reporters why the Fed was not simply acting now to raise interest rates. His answer was that such impatience was not warranted.
Meanwhile, investors evidently now expect the Fed to raise the benchmark rate at its next meeting in September. The futures market’s implied probability of a rate hike in September is now 68%. Plus, there is an implied probability of 89% that the Fed will raise the benchmark rate at least once before the end of the year, as well as a roughly 48% likelihood of two or more hikes before the end of the year.
The expectation that the Fed will tighten monetary policy this year reflects concern that oil prices are likely to remain elevated or even rise further, mainly due to the risk of continued conflict in the Middle East. Following an Iranian attack on US facilities this week, the United States and Saudi Arabia attacked Iran-allied facilities in Iraq. These actions led to a sharp rebound in the price of oil.
Following Warsh’s press conference, yields began to soar, with the yield on the 30-year bond hitting the highest level since 2007. Plus, the gap between the yields on 30-year and two-year bonds shot up by almost 20 basis points.
Why did this happen? First, many investors were hoping that the Fed would increase the benchmark rate and were disappointed, especially given current inflationary pressures. Moreover, in his press conference, Warsh indicated that inflation remains too high. Yet, when asked several times why the Fed did not raise rates immediately, his answers may not have been satisfactory to many investors. He largely indicated that there is no need for impatience.
Second, Warsh did not indicate an intention to raise rates. When discussing how the Fed would respond if inflation remains elevated, he said that interest rates were one “part of the equation,” suggesting that there might be other inflation-fighting tools—although he did not say what those tools might be. Moreover, he said that there could be indicators other than the personal consumption expenditures deflator for measuring inflation, yet he did not indicate what those indicators might be. Finally, he suggested that, by boosting yields, the market is already tightening monetary policy, thereby suggesting that the Fed might not need to do anything.
Third, he reiterated his opposition to forward guidance. And, unlike in the past, there were no dot plots. Thus, investors have no guidance as to the Fed’s future intentions, thereby creating a perception of greater risk.
Normally, a Fed meeting that leaves the benchmark interest rate unchanged means no news and no significant movement in asset prices. But this time, the situation was different. Although the benchmark rate remained unchanged, asset prices moved a lot, as comments from the chair evidently created uncertainty.
In the second quarter, real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product was up at an annualized rate of 1.5% from the previous quarter, down from 2.1% in the first quarter. Real consumer spending grew at a very strong rate of 3.2%, accounting for more than 100% of GDP growth. This was partly offset by a strong 14.7% rise in imports.
Households appear to be keen to maintain a high level of spending despite the sharp rise in the price of gasoline. Consequently, the personal savings rate (share of disposable income that is saved) fell from 3.5% in March to 2.7% in June—the lowest rate in four years and one of the lowest rates on record. This probably cannot continue indefinitely, in which case, the pace of spending growth should weaken in the months to come absent offsetting factors. Meanwhile, spending growth was largely fueled by demand for durable goods.
Meanwhile, real nonresidential fixed investment grew at a rate of 8.4% in the second quarter. Notably, growth was strong despite investment in structures falling at a rate of 5%. Investment in equipment grew at a rate of 15.2%, while investment in intellectual property was up 8.8%. These numbers were likely fueled by AI. Investment in AI largely involved investment in information technology equipment as well as software. These two modest categories accounted for 46% of real GDP growth in the second quarter. These categories had accounted for 129% of GDP growth in the first quarter. In other words, absent investment in AI, the economy would barely have grown in the first half of the year.