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Asia Pacific Q3 2026 financial crime regulatory report

 

The Deloitte Asia Pacific Centre for Regulatory Strategy (ACRS) is pleased to share the first edition of the Asia Pacific financial crime regulatory report, offering a quarterly review of financial crime regulatory developments across the region to help financial institutions (FIs) understand changing regulatory expectations on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF), scams and fraud. During the third quarter (Q3) of 2026, regulators extended AML/CTF coverage, sharpened scrutiny of control effectiveness, and strengthened responses to scams and technology-enabled fraud. Regulatory attention is focused on whether institutions can counter an increasingly complex financial crime ecosystem that stretches beyond traditional banking, while building robust, structural resistance against highly sophisticated, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled attacks.

Regulators are extending financial crime oversight across a wider range of sectors and services to address existing gaps. Australia’s expanded AML/CTF regime brought specified services provided by professional gatekeepers, including lawyers, accountants and real estate businesses, within scope, while legislative progress continued with the House of Representatives passing the AML/CTF Amendment Bill 2026 to introduce ministerial powers restricting high-risk products such as cryptocurrency automated teller machines (crypto ATMs). Vietnam legislated to include crypto-asset services in its AML framework from 1 December 2026 and strengthen beneficial ownership transparency, including for legal arrangements. This framework is complemented by a decree imposing administrative penalties of up to VND 200 million for pilot crypto-asset market violations, with non-compliance risking operational sanctions such as the suspension of trading for up to 12 months and service provision for up to six months. Meanwhile, Taiwan (China (‘Taiwan’)) strengthened its market abuse defences by passing the Virtual Asset Service Act. The legislation elevates oversight from an anti-money laundering registration framework to a comprehensive licensing regime, while explicitly criminalising fraudulent, deceptive, and price-manipulating activities with prison terms of three to ten years. Further, Singapore proposed technical amendments to clarify statutory supervision and cooperation powers relating to proliferation financing. These measures address different exposures but share a common purpose of ensuring that financial crime controls reach beyond traditional financial institutions to other participants that facilitate transactions, hold assets, or help establish ownership structures.

As coverage expands, regulators are also seeking stronger evidence that controls work in practice, especially where failure could lead to customer losses through scams. For instance, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has stated that it will hold an internet broker or an SFC-licensed virtual asset service provider (VASP) accountable for client losses if the firm fails to implement adequate measures to prevent, detect and stop large-scale unauthorised transactions through client accounts following a hacking incident.  Japan’s Financial Services Agency (JFSA) stated in its Initiatives and Challenges in Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financial Crime (July 2026) report that, with basic AML/CTF frameworks largely established, the focus remains on verifying their effectiveness, particularly in disrupting illicit fund flows from fraudulent activities. Similarly, the July information paper issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) highlights its expectation that digital payment token service providers (DPTSPs) conduct gap assessments and root-cause analyses and promptly address weaknesses in their anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism, and countering proliferation financing (AML/CFT/CPF) controls in response to MAS’s supervisory observations.

Separately, MAS’s newly issued payment service provider (PSP) audit guidelines allow external auditors to adopt a risk-based approach for subsequent annual AML/CFT reviews. Under this framework, auditors must test high-risk areas and previously identified deficiencies every year, while lower-risk areas can be reviewed on a rotational basis. Notably, for new licensees and those introducing new services, auditors are explicitly required to perform an end-to-end review of the adequacy and operating effectiveness of their ML/TF and technology risk controls one-year post-commencement. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) also emphasised reinforcing the role of compliance officers and board-level accountability. Thus, a documented framework is only a starting point, with supervisors seeking evidence that controls work in practice and weaknesses are addressed promptly. 

Authorities are strengthening cross-sector information sharing and coordinated action to detect scams and disrupt the movement of illicit funds. Singapore enacted the Scams (Countermeasures) and Other Matters Act 2026. Once the relevant provisions commence, police will be able to order service providers to disclose account information or disable suspected scam-linked accounts under specified conditions. The Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) was authorised on 1 July 2026 as the external dispute resolution scheme under Australia’s Scams Prevention Framework. Entities providing regulated banking, telecommunications, or digital platform services were required to be AFCA members from 1 September 2026, ahead of the framework’s operational commencement for scam-related complaints on 31 March 2027, generally after the business’s internal complaints process. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) consulted on standardised procedures for temporary debit holds on suspected money-mule transactions or accounts, including customer notification, review and coordination with law enforcement. Taiwan’s newly mandated cross-sector joint-defence notifications and centralised anti-fraud platform connect information across deposit-taking institutions, electronic payment providers, credit card companies, and VASPs to detect and disrupt fraud networks. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation’s (PAGCOR) casino-sector risk assessment, circulated in July, highlights how funds moving across multiple institutions can limit individual institutions’ visibility, making information sharing important for detecting suspicious activity. 

At the same time, technology-enabled threats are prompting more specific expectations for authentication and transaction monitoring. A verified customer relationship offers limited protection if criminals subsequently compromise the account or bypass authentication. Hong Kong SAR and Japan addressed this exposure through phishing-resistant authentication and access monitoring, while Thailand consulted on facial recognition safeguards designed to withstand deepfakes. Additionally, AUSTRAC’s warnings on synthetic identities and insider-enabled fraud reinforce the need to examine how controls can be bypassed at different stages. Its September supervisory findings on money-mule activity at foreign bank subsidiaries similarly emphasised the need to connect AML/CTF and fraud prevention controls across the customer lifecycle. 

Recognising that stronger controls carry costs, regulators are seeking to ease burdens in lower-risk situations while strengthening controls over activities that are more vulnerable to financial crime. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) reinforced differentiated treatment of politically exposed persons (PEPs), with PEP-specific enhanced due diligence required for current non-Hong Kong PEPs but applied to current Hong Kong and international organisation PEPs only where assessed risks are high. In New Zealand, the Department of Internal Affairs became the single AML/CFT supervisor from 1 July 2026. New Zealand’s AML/CFT National Strategy 2026–2030 similarly seeks simpler treatment of lower-risk customers, addressing concerns that overly prescriptive requirements increase costs, slow onboarding, and contribute to financial exclusion. Alongside this emphasis on proportionality, regulators are addressing vulnerabilities in specific transaction channels. Mainland China consulted on revised rules for multi-purpose prepaid cards, while Thailand consulted on extending cash-transaction checks to deposits and currency exchange. Greater traceability is also a priority for digital asset transfers, with Japan expanding its Travel Rule designations and Thailand issuing new Travel Rule requirements effective from 27 February 2027. Australia’s Travel Rule for virtual-asset transfers also took effect on 1 July 2026, alongside expanded coverage of virtual-asset services. 

Overall, financial crime regulation in the Asia Pacific region is expanding beyond traditional institutions and towards greater accountability by relevant stakeholders. This is supported by emphasis on shared information, coordinated action between different agencies, and stronger testing of controls to ensure that they work in practice. The detailed updates that follow outline these developments by jurisdiction, while other notable updates from across the region are captured in the appendix.

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