

# Public consultation on strengthening the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement

Fields marked with \* are mandatory.

## Introduction

This consultation is now available in 23 European Union official languages.

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High quality and reliable corporate reporting is of key importance for healthy financial markets, business investment and economic growth. The [EU corporate reporting framework](#) should ensure that companies publish the right quantity and quality of relevant information allowing investors and other interested stakeholders to assess the company's performance and governance and to take decisions based on it. High quality reporting is also indispensable for cross-border investments and the development of the [capital markets union \(CMU\)](#).

In the context of this consultation, corporate reporting comprises the financial statements of companies, their management report that includes the non-financial and corporate governance statements and country-by-country reporting. It would also include sustainability information pursuant to the [proposed Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive](#).

The consultation takes into account the outcomes of the [2018 consultation on the EU framework for public reporting by companies](#) and the [2021 fitness check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies](#). This consultation however focuses on companies listed on EU regulated markets (hereafter 'listed companies' or 'issuers'), that is a subset of the companies subject to public reporting requirements under EU law. Please note that in terms of reporting, this consultation does not seek the views of stakeholders on the applicable accounting standards, such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or the standards in the Accounting Directive, or the views of stakeholders on public country-by-country reporting or the Commission's proposal for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive.

The 2018 consultation did not cover the areas of corporate governance or statutory audit. Therefore, this consultation contains questions to evaluate aspects of the [Audit Regulation 537/2014](#), [Audit Directive 2006/43/EC](#) and of [Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU](#). However, it covers the EU framework on corporate governance only in so far as relevant for corporate reporting by listed companies and the statutory audit of so-called public interest entities (PIEs). Listed companies, credit institutions, insurance undertakings and entities designated as such by Member States are PIEs.

This consultation also builds on the work carried out by the [European Securities and Markets Authority \(ESMA\)](#) and the [Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies \(CEAOB\)](#).

This consultation is divided into 5 parts

- The first part seeks your views about the overall impact of the EU framework on the three pillars of high quality and reliable corporate reporting - corporate governance, statutory audit and supervision. It also seeks your views about the interaction between the three pillars
- The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the corporate governance pillar, as far as relevant for corporate reporting. It aims to get your feedback in particular on the functioning of company boards, audit committees and your views on how to improve their functioning
- The third part focuses on the statutory [audit pillar](#). The first questions in this part aim at getting your views on the effectiveness, efficiency and coherence of the EU audit framework. It focuses in particular on the changes brought by the [2014 audit reform](#). Subsequently, the questions aim to seek views on how to improve the functioning of statutory audit
- The fourth part asks questions about the supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms
- Finally, the consultation will ask questions about the supervision of corporate reporting and how to improve it

This consultation will directly feed into an impact assessment that the Commission will prepare in 2022 with a view to possibly amend and strengthen the current EU rules.

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**Please note:** In order to ensure a fair and transparent consultation process **only responses received through our online questionnaire will be taken into account** and included in the report summarising the responses. Should you have a problem completing this questionnaire or if you require particular assistance, please contact [fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu](mailto:fisma-corporate-reporting@ec.europa.eu).

More information on

- [this consultation](#)
- [the consultation document](#)
- [the consultation strategy](#)
- [company reporting](#)
- [the protection of personal data regime for this consultation](#)

## About you

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\* Language of my contribution

- Bulgarian
- Croatian
- Czech

- Danish
- Dutch
- English
- Estonian
- Finnish
- French
- German
- Greek
- Hungarian
- Irish
- Italian
- Latvian
- Lithuanian
- Maltese
- Polish
- Portuguese
- Romanian
- Slovak
- Slovenian
- Spanish
- Swedish

\* I am giving my contribution as

- Academic/research institution
- Business association
- Company/business organisation
- Consumer organisation
- EU citizen
- Environmental organisation
- Non-EU citizen
- Non-governmental organisation (NGO)
- Public authority
- Trade union
- Other

\* First name

Christiane

\* Surname

Cunningham

\* Email (this won't be published)

chcunningham@deloitte.com

\* Organisation name

*255 character(s) maximum*

Deloitte

\* Organisation size

- Micro (1 to 9 employees)
- Small (10 to 49 employees)
- Medium (50 to 249 employees)
- Large (250 or more)

Transparency register number

*255 character(s) maximum*

Check if your organisation is on the [transparency register](#). It's a voluntary database for organisations seeking to influence EU decision-making.

5399427850437

\* Country of origin

Please add your country of origin, or that of your organisation.

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| <input type="radio"/> Åland Islands  | <input type="radio"/> Dominica           | <input type="radio"/> Liechtenstein | <input type="radio"/> Saint Pierre and Miquelon        |
| <input type="radio"/> Albania        | <input type="radio"/> Dominican Republic | <input type="radio"/> Lithuania     | <input type="radio"/> Saint Vincent and the Grenadines |
| <input type="radio"/> Algeria        | <input type="radio"/> Ecuador            | <input type="radio"/> Luxembourg    | <input type="radio"/> Samoa                            |
| <input type="radio"/> American Samoa | <input type="radio"/> Egypt              | <input type="radio"/> Macau         | <input type="radio"/> San Marino                       |
| <input type="radio"/> Andorra        | <input type="radio"/> El Salvador        | <input type="radio"/> Madagascar    | <input type="radio"/>                                  |

- Angola
- Anguilla
- Antarctica
- Antigua and Barbuda
- Argentina
- Armenia
- Aruba
- Australia
- Austria
- Azerbaijan
- Bahamas
- Bahrain
- Bangladesh
- Barbados
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Belize
- Benin
- Bermuda
- Bhutan
- Bolivia
- Bonaire Saint Eustatius and Saba
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Botswana
- Bouvet Island
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- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Estonia
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Falkland Islands
- Faroe Islands
- Fiji
- Finland
- France
- French Guiana
- French Polynesia
- French Southern and Antarctic Lands
- Gabon
- Georgia
- Germany
- Ghana
- Gibraltar
- Greece
- Greenland
- Grenada
- Guadeloupe
- Guam
- Guatemala
- Guernsey
- 
- Malawi
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Mali
- Malta
- Marshall Islands
- Martinique
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mayotte
- Mexico
- Micronesia
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Mongolia
- Montenegro
- Montserrat
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Myanmar/Burma
- Namibia
- Nauru
- Nepal
- Netherlands
- New Caledonia
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- São Tomé and Príncipe
- Saudi Arabia
- Senegal
- Serbia
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Singapore
- Sint Maarten
- Slovakia
- Slovenia
- Solomon Islands
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
- South Korea
- South Sudan
- Spain
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Svalbard and Jan Mayen
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- Syria
- Taiwan
- Tajikistan
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- Brazil
- British Indian Ocean Territory
- British Virgin Islands
- Brunei
- Bulgaria
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Canada
- Cape Verde
- Cayman Islands
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Chile
- China
- Christmas Island
- Clipperton
- Cocos (Keeling) Islands
- Colombia
- Comoros
- Congo
- Cook Islands
- Costa Rica
- Côte d'Ivoire
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- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Heard Island and McDonald Islands
- Honduras
- Hong Kong
- Hungary
- Iceland
- India
- Indonesia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Ireland
- Isle of Man
- Israel
- Italy
- Jamaica
- Japan
- Jersey
- Jordan
- Kazakhstan
- Kenya
- Kiribati
- Kosovo
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- New Zealand
- Nicaragua
- Niger
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- Niue
- Norfolk Island
- Northern Mariana Islands
- North Korea
- North Macedonia
- Norway
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Palau
- Palestine
- Panama
- Papua New Guinea
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Philippines
- Pitcairn Islands
- Poland
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- Puerto Rico
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- Tanzania
- Thailand
- The Gambia
- Timor-Leste
- Togo
- Tokelau
- Tonga
- Trinidad and Tobago
- Tunisia
- Turkey
- Turkmenistan
- Turks and Caicos Islands
- Tuvalu
- Uganda
- Ukraine
- United Arab Emirates
- United Kingdom
- United States
- United States Minor Outlying Islands
- Uruguay
- US Virgin Islands
- Uzbekistan
- Vanuatu
- Vatican City
- Venezuela
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| <input type="radio"/> Croatia                                | <input type="radio"/> Kuwait     | <input type="radio"/> Romania   | <input type="radio"/> Vietnam           |
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| <input type="radio"/> Czechia                                | <input type="radio"/> Lebanon    | <input type="radio"/> Saint Helena<br>Ascension and<br>Tristan da Cunha | <input type="radio"/> Zambia            |
| <input type="radio"/> Democratic<br>Republic of the<br>Congo | <input type="radio"/> Lesotho    | <input type="radio"/> Saint Kitts and<br>Nevis                          | <input type="radio"/> Zimbabwe          |
| <input type="radio"/> Denmark                                | <input type="radio"/> Liberia    | <input type="radio"/> Saint Lucia                                       |   |

\* Is your organisation a public interest entity or a listed company?

- A public interest entity
- A listed company
- None of the above
- Don't know / not applicable

\* Role in the corporate reporting market

- Preparer of corporate reporting
- User of of corporate reporting
- Preparer and user of corporate reporting
- Statutory auditor
- Accounting professional
- Supervisor
- None
- Other

\* Field of activity or sector (if applicable)

- Accounting
- Auditing
- Banking
- Credit rating agencies
- Insurance
- Pension provision

- Investment management (e.g. hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, money market funds, securities)
- Market infrastructure operation (e.g. CCPs, CSDs, Stock exchanges)
- Other financial services (e.g. advice, brokerage)
- Social entrepreneurship
- Trade repositories
- Other
- Not applicable

The Commission will publish all contributions to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would prefer to have your details published or to remain anonymous when your contribution is published. **For the purpose of transparency, the type of respondent (for example, 'business association, 'consumer association', 'EU citizen') country of origin, organisation name and size, and its transparency register number, are always published. Your e-mail address will never be published.** Opt in to select the privacy option that best suits you. Privacy options default based on the type of respondent selected

#### \* Contribution publication privacy settings

The Commission will publish the responses to this public consultation. You can choose whether you would like your details to be made public or to remain anonymous.

##### **Anonymous**

Only organisation details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published as received. Your name will not be published. Please do not include any personal data in the contribution itself if you want to remain anonymous.

##### **Public**

Organisation details and respondent details are published: The type of respondent that you responded to this consultation as, the name of the organisation on whose behalf you reply as well as its transparency number, its size, its country of origin and your contribution will be published. Your name will also be published.

I agree with the [personal data protection provisions](#)

## Part I - The EU framework for high quality and reliable corporate reporting

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The EU framework for corporate reporting has developed significantly since the EU adopted the [fourth company law Directive \(Directive 78/660/EEC\)](#) which coordinated the national provisions on the presentation, content and publication of annual accounts and management reports of limited liability companies. This Directive also already required a statutory audit of the annual accounts of limited liability companies.

Today, the [Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU](#), the [Statutory Audit Directive \(2006/43/EU\)](#) and [Audit Regulation \(537/2014\)](#) and the [Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC](#) provide the main requirements that ensure the quality of corporate reporting and its enforcement in the EU. Moreover, the [ESMA Regulation \(EU\)1095/2010](#) gives tasks to ESMA in relation to corporate reporting. Given the inclusion of the Transparency Directive in the scope of the ESMA Regulation ESMA can make use of its powers in the ESMA Regulation, such as to issue guidelines.

The main elements of this framework that guarantee the quality and reliability of corporate reporting can be summarised as follows

- **C o r p o r a t e** **g o v e r n a n c e :**  
Responsibility of company boards for corporate reporting; the establishment by PIE's of an audit committee to minimise risks and to enhance the quality of financial reporting
- **A u d i t :**  
The requirements for a statutory audit of the annual accounts to ensure that there are no material misstatements
- **S u p e r v i s i o n :**  
The supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms to ensure the quality of audits and the supervision of corporate reporting by listed companies to ensure the quality of corporate reporting

The three pillars of the corporate reporting framework can be mutually reinforcing. At the same time, weaknesses in one pillar also negatively impact other pillars. Appropriate responsibilities and supervision of company boards provide incentives to company boards to focus on the quality of their corporate reporting. It will also incentivise them to see statutory audit not as a burden, but as an important external check by statutory auditors. On the other hand, where company boards are insufficiently accountable and supervised, there is a risk that boards may pay insufficient attention to the quality of reporting and that they provide insufficient resources for a proper audit.

**Question 1. As a user of corporate reporting (retail or wholesale investor, credit rating agency, NGO, public authority, employees, suppliers, other stakeholders), what is the relative importance of the information contained therein compared to other sources of information?**

- 1 - Very low
- 2 - Low
- 3 - Medium
- 4 - High
- 5 - Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Question 2. How do you assess the overall effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added value of the EU legislation, considering each of the pillars underpinning corporate reporting individually, but also in combination with each other?**

**a) Corporate governance**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

## b) Statutory audit

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) Supervision by public authorities of statutory auditors/audit firms**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Relevant in terms of	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

overall needs and objectives						
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**d) Supervision by authorities of corporate reporting**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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**e) The eco-system composed of all of the above**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Relevant in terms of overall needs and objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
IV. Coherence with other related EU frameworks / internal coherence	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
V. EU Added value: was and is EU intervention justified?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 2.1 Please describe the main issues that you see, if any, in the four areas mentioned in question 2 and in the eco-system composed of all four areas. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.**

**You may want to consider the following aspects**

- **have any factors reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?**
- **is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?**
- **are existing provisions coherent with each other?**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Corporate governance

The main issues we see are the lack of:

- clarity on board accountability and responsibility for the reliability and quality of corporate reporting (see Q 7.1) and
- a clear requirement for companies to have effective internal controls (ICs) over financial reporting (and in due course over broader corporate reporting), with related board disclosures and responsibility (see Q9.1).

Statutory audit

The EU legal framework is already very comprehensive, following an extensive reform mainly applying as from 2016. The main issues we see result from a lack of consistency of audit rules across the EU (e.g. mandatory firm rotation periods and auditor inspections), which reduce effectiveness and increase operational costs for companies and auditors. There is a need for greater transparency on the role, value and quality of audits (see Q11 and Q14.1.1).

Supervision of statutory auditors

In our view, the main issues are the lack of application of consistent methodologies, resources and processes for inspections and reporting of results.

Supervision of corporate reporting

We consider the main issues to be:

- a lack of clarity as to Member States' rules on the supervision and enforcement powers of National Competent Authorities (NCAs) in charge of enforcement
- inconsistent supervisory and enforcement powers of NCAs across the EU
- the need to reinforce supervision and coordination of NCAs by the European Securities and Markets

Authority (ESMA) to help improve supervision across the EU via best practices and making it more consistent and seamless

- the need to develop the supervision of non-financial/sustainability reporting up to the level of that of financial reporting (with adequate resources at national and ESMA levels) and
- the need to reinforce the ability for dialogue between auditors and supervisors at national and ESMA levels.

(see Q19.1.1).

The [ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020](#) notes that supervisors undertook the examination that year of 729 financial statements drawn up in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Based on these examinations, European enforcers took enforcement actions against 265 issuers in order to address material departures from IFRS. This represents an action rate of 38%.

As regards the audit sector the [Commission's market monitoring report](#) highlights deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems, but also in individual files for audits of PIEs. National audit oversight bodies also report that part of statutory audits is not up to standards.

### **Question 3. Based on your own experience how do you assess the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by listed EU companies?**

- 1 - Very low
- 2 - Low
- 3 - Medium
- 4 - High
- 5 - Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

### **Question 3.1 Please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment in question 3 and explain the consequences that the quality and reliability of corporate reporting or lack thereof has on you.**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

As requirements for other aspects of corporate reporting, such as the non- financial statement and corporate governance statement are far less detailed and more recent, and will be changed by the CSRD, we will focus on financial reporting.

With respect to financial reporting, the overall framework, which aims primarily at providing quality information to investors, is working. The April 2021 European Commission Staff Working Document 'Fitness Check on the EU framework for public reporting by companies' confirms this. It indicates that "The reliability of financial information disclosed by listed companies was found to be overall good, due to the cascade of requirements of collective board responsibility for the true and fair view of financial statements, to the mandatory statutory audit for all listed companies, and securities market supervision. However, enforcement practices of national supervisors still differ significantly across the EU. The Wirecard case confirmed this and indicated that the EU framework presents potential weaknesses as regards the effectiveness of enforcement practices, particularly in relation to the lack of coordination between national authorities and the

independence of the authorities in charge of examining financial information”.

See further comments in response to Q18 and Q19.



**Question 4. There are no generally accepted standards or indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting and of statutory audit, nor the effectiveness of supervision. In light of this, what are your views on the following questions?**

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Would it be useful to have specific indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Is it possible to have clear and reliable indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audit and the effectiveness of supervision?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Should the European Commission develop indicators on the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 4.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and, where relevant, please suggest possible indicators of the quality and reliability of corporate reporting, statutory audit and supervision, where possible with concrete examples:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

It may be worth exploring the possibility of having specific indicators to measure the quality of corporate reporting, of statutory audits and the effectiveness of supervision, to be able to (i) compare how they evolve over time and between companies and markets, (ii) help identify possible best practices and increase quality and confidence in corporate reporting, and (iii) help give investors and other stakeholders a useful basis for distinguishing between companies. However, we recognise that it is difficult to have clear and reliable indicators capable of measuring quality consistently, other than quantifying input.

Regarding statutory audit, PIE audit firms will comply as from this year with the International Standard on Quality Management 1 (ISQM1), which introduces new requirements for their quality management systems, including communication of the firm's system of quality management to external parties. These new requirements may be reflected in audit firms' transparency reports which include a description of a firm's quality control system and a statement on its effectiveness (Article 17 of the EU Audit Regulation).

ESMA and the Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB) report annually on respectively enforcement by NCAs and investigations and sanctioning by Member State audit supervisors. These assessments may over time help establish meaningful indicators.

**Question 5. In your view, should the Commission take action in the areas of the corporate governance pillar, the statutory audit pillar, the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms and the supervision of corporate reporting to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?**

- Yes, there is a need to improve the **some or all of the areas listed above**
- Yes, there is a need to improve some or all of the areas listed above **as well as other areas**
- No, but there is a need to improve other areas than those listed above
- No, there is no need to take further action in any area
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Please indicate to what extent you think the Commission should take action in each of the areas below to increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies:**

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Improve the corporate governance pillar	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Improve the statutory audit pillar	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Improve the supervision of PIE auditors and audit firms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Improve the supervision of corporate reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**If you think there is a need to improve other areas than those listed above please indicate which areas you have in mind:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

**Question 5.1 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views, and where appropriate describe what actions you would prioritise and why, with concrete examples:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Regarding supervision of corporate reporting, whilst the infrastructure (combination of NCAs' and ESMA's responsibilities) and framework are delivering appropriate results for financial reporting, improvements can still be identified. In relation to the supervision of the non-financial statements and the future sustainability reporting under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), whilst the infrastructure in place for financial reporting may also be adequate, more supervisory resources are needed, to bring the quality of the supervision up to the level of the supervision of financial reporting. See comments at Q19.1.1.

**Question 5.2 At what level should action be taken to improve the quality of corporate governance, audit, audit supervision and/or supervision of corporate reporting?**

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
Companies themselves should take action to improve their reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Auditors themselves should take action to improve audits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Audit supervisors themselves should take action to improve their functioning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Individual Member States should take action if the situation in their market requires this	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The EU should take action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Several of the above should take action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 5.3 Please provide any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 5.2:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Each of the pillars of the corporate reporting framework has its part to play in strengthening its effectiveness under the current EU and Member State laws and regulations. But the EU framework should in our view also be adapted, to create more consistency in areas where there is already considerable EU legislation such as audit. Balanced, proportionate, consistent and effective EU-wide requirements will protect investors in EU markets and allow companies, investors and other users of corporate reporting, as well as auditors, to operate in those EU markets in their respective roles.

**Question 6. To what extent is there a need to modify the EU framework on corporate reporting to support the following objectives?**

	1 (not at all necessary)	2 (rather not necessary)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather necessary)	5 (highly necessary)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. The green transition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. The digital transition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Facilitating doing business by SMEs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
IV. Reducing burdens and/or simplification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
V. Better corporate social responsibility, including tax transparency and fair taxation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 6.1 Please provide, if needed, any further explanation supporting your views expressed in question 6:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We support the current European Commission initiative for a Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive to address the lack of sufficient content and quality of non-financial reporting, which is needed to have transparency on how companies are contributing to the green transition.

We support the European Commission initiatives for further digitalisation of corporate reporting, not just for listed entities, as long as requirements are consistent across the EU. We also support the European Single Access Point (ESAP) initiative which would allow stakeholders to have easier access to information.

## Part II - Corporate governance

The EU corporate governance framework focuses on the relationships between company boards, shareholders and other stakeholders, and therefore, on the way a company is managed and controlled. The framework consists of a combination of EU and Member State legislation and soft law, namely national corporate governance codes applied on a 'comply or explain' basis. It aims inter alia to provide protection for shareholders and other parties with a particular interest in companies, such as employees and creditors.

A [sustainable corporate governance initiative](#) is planned to be adopted by the Commission in 2021. (In addition, the [Commission's study on directors' duties and sustainable corporate governance, July 2020](#), assesses the root causes of 'short termism' in corporate governance and discusses their relationship with current market practices and/or regulatory frameworks).

Key features of the EU framework on corporate governance that are relevant for corporate reporting are

- The collective responsibility of the members of the administrative, management and supervisory bodies of a company for drawing up and publishing annual financial statements and management reports
- The requirement for a statement by the persons responsible within the issuer that, to the best of their knowledge, the financial statements prepared give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the issuer
- The requirement for PIEs to establish, in principle, an audit committee

**Question 7. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU framework on corporate governance, considering how they underpin quality and reliability of corporate reporting?**

### a) Board responsibilities for reporting

	<b>1</b> (very low)	<b>2</b> (low)	<b>3</b> (medium)	<b>4</b> (high)	<b>5</b> (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable



I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**b) Liability of company boards for reporting**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**c) Obligation to establish an audit committee**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable

I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**d) Rules on the composition of the audit committee**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**e) Tasks of the audit committee**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable

I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**f) External position of the audit committee (e.g. in relation to shareholders)**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**Question 7.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, as regards corporate governance and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.**

**You may want to consider the following aspects**

- **are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?**
- **is there room to improve efficiency via further simplification?**
- **are existing provisions coherent with each other?**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

In the past, corporate governance and company law have mainly been left to Member States law. Some Member States have solid and well-established corporate governance models. The existing EU corporate governance framework is high-level to accommodate the different Member States' frameworks regarding board responsibilities and liability. While we recognise the need to leave Member States flexibility to keep developing their corporate governance model, this has led to a rather fragmented application of the EU governance framework throughout the EU and a less effective and transparent regime than anticipated. The lower ratings attributed to certain features in Question 7 reflect this.

More specifically with regards to the responsibility of Board members for financial reporting and management reports:

- responsibilities of Board members vary across the 27 EU Member States and there is no level playing field
- the obligations of companies and Boards with regards to the quality of the information provided via corporate reporting are unclear and there is a lack of accountability across the EU

Re audit committees, in several Member States:

- there is a lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities of audit committees
- the current responsibilities do not ensure that there is sufficient independence of the audit committees from executive management
- audit committees do not always have adequate competences and expertise

There may be also a need to reflect on how non-EU (or EEA) companies looking to raise capital in EU/EEA markets can effectively be held accountable for annual financial reporting and management reports.

**Question 8. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS reported in the [ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020](#), to what extent can such departures be attributed to deficiencies of the EU framework on corporate governance?**

- 1 - Not at all
- 2 - To a limited extent
- 3 - To some extent
- 4 - To a large extent
- 5 - To a very large extent
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Question 8.1 Please explain the main issues you see, and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

See our reply to Q18.1 below

**Question 9. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?**

**a) Strengthen the (collective) responsibilities of the board / tasks for reporting / liability of boards for incorrect reporting**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**b) Require proper expertise of specific board members in relation to corporate reporting (internal controls, accounting framework, sustainability reporting, etc.)**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) Increase the responsibilities of specific board members (e.g. Chief Executive Officer or the Chief Financial Officer) and their liability on corporate reporting**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



**d) Give company boards an explicit responsibility to establish effective risk management and internal control systems for the preparation of corporate reporting, including as regards controls for risks of fraud and going concern**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**e) More transparency of company boards about the effectiveness of the companies' risk management and report on the actions undertaken during the reporting period**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**f) Remove exemptions in EU legislation for establishing an audit committee**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**g) Increase the tasks of the audit committee, e.g. for providing assurance on internal control systems for the avoidance of risk and fraud and going concern**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**h) Strengthen the external position of the audit committee (e.g. vis-à-vis the auditor or by reporting to shareholders)**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**i) Require the setting up of specific whistle blowing procedures inside listed companies and supervisors of corporate reporting to strengthen the protection of whistle blowers**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**j) Require auditors to provide assurance on the systems and internal controls implemented by the board, including fraud, going concern and related reporting requirements**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**k) Strengthen the role of shareholders on corporate reporting**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



**Question 9.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?**

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**9.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 9.1:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Enhanced requirements already exist in some MS. In Italy, listed companies must appoint a manager to prepare corporate accounting documents (including the design and implementation of adequate procedures and ICs), and issue a written statement confirming adequate procedures and ICs supporting the preparation of documents and communications to the market. In Spain, the board is responsible for implementing and maintaining the company's IC system, and preparing the financial report and additional information. The 2021 German FISG law requires listed companies to establish and maintain effective operating risk management and IC systems.

We suggest that boards/management disclose statements on:

- risk assessment process and framework used (including assessments of fraud and going concern risks)
- proper design and operating effectiveness of the company's IC over corporate reporting (including those conducted to assess and mitigate fraud and going concern risks). This could be subject to independent external assurance to increase its reliability, and regulatory oversight.

We suggest that audit committees:

- strengthen their expertise in accounting, corporate reporting, auditing and IC
- oversee that the board/management has established effective IC and risk management processes and systems focused on viability (resilience and going concern) and fraud risk
- assess the board/management's statements and oversee executive management's attestation of ICs over financial reporting effectiveness, where required
- oversee company's audit and assurance policy setting out the required audit services based on business model risks
- hold regular dialogue with audit supervisory authorities

We suggest that companies have an independent internal audit function, reporting significant matters directly to the audit committee, in particular those related to the effectiveness of the entity's internal quality controls and risk management systems regarding corporate reporting.

**Question 9.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We support EU-wide requirements for management/the board to establish effective IC over financial reporting, including a focus on the risk of fraud and going concern and to publish a statement on their effectiveness.

An effective IC environment has multiple benefits:

- improved operational effectiveness, efficiency and reliability, allowing companies to delve deeper into their business model
- reduced risks of job and investment losses, unexpected corporate failures, material frauds and material accounting misstatements, leading to greater protection for shareholders and other stakeholders. Many frauds begin due to weaknesses in operational controls and the lack of IC culture is often cited as a key causal factor in company failures
- increased reliability and usefulness of corporate reporting, helping users to differentiate between companies and make better informed judgments
- IC provides the basis for the external auditor to deliver high-quality financial audits

The IC framework should be aligned to the key risks in the entity's business model. IC and risk management framework related to financial and sustainability reporting should be included in the scope of oversight of PIE regulators.

A proportionate and step-by-step approach could be considered, exempting smaller PIEs from different requirements during an initial phase (though with an option to report on the effectiveness of their IC system and obtain auditor's attestation on a voluntary basis), with a regulatory requirement brought in at a later date.

As corporate reporting extends, responsibilities around IC will also need to broaden. An initial phase might include the use of safe harbours for directors (and auditors/assurance providers) for disclosures ahead of IC frameworks, reporting standards and market practice.

We also underline the importance of a diverse and balanced board of directors to constructively challenge and assist management.

## Part III - Statutory audit

The overall objective of statutory audits is to ensure that financial statements are free from material misstatements and provide a true and fair view. The auditor has to identify and assess the risk of material misstatements and gather sufficient and appropriate audit evidence as the basis for his opinion that the financial statements provide a true and fair view and to publicly report on the results of his audit work. The EU audit rules promote audit quality and seek to ensure the independence of auditors and audit firms.

Therefore, the final objective of statutory audit is to contribute to the quality and reliability of financial statements of companies.

**Question 10. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency and the coherence with other relevant EU frameworks of the key features of EU audit legislation in so far as it applies to PIE auditors and audit firms?**

### a) The rules on independence of auditors/audit firms and absence of conflicts of interest

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness						

in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**b) The rules on the content of the audit and of the audit report**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) The rules applicable to non-audit services**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness						

in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**d) The rules on auditor/audit firm rotation**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

**e) The rules on transparency (transparency report, additional reports to other parties / audit committees / supervisors)**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable

I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 11. Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in the audit pillar and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment.**

**You may want to consider the following aspects**

- **are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?**
- **is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?**
- **are existing provisions coherent with each other?**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

The lack of consistent rules on audit across the EU (e.g. variations in auditing standards and their interpretation, mandatory firm rotation rules, how oversight authorities inspect and report on audit firms, requirements for non-audit services) is already giving rise to unnecessary complexity and risks, and creates operational costs for audited entities and their auditors.

The cost and complexity of managing these differing audit requirements across the EU, combined with liability risk, may be impacting audit supply for the largest listed companies.

We recognise concerns about limited choice for the largest companies listed on regulated markets. This is a situation that has developed over many decades in response to market demand for the ability to audit very

large and complex global businesses, with mergers between networks and significant investments by the largest audit firm networks leading to capabilities including:

- i. the strength and depth of technical and industry skills
- ii. technology, including technology platforms, methodologies and processes
- iii. the breadth and depth of global networks
- iv. financial strength

All these factors could be seen as barriers to entry, though they are necessary elements required to execute the highest quality audits of the most complex global companies.

In addition, the introduction of mandatory rotation has arguably led to more market concentration. For example, in France the participation of challenger audit firms (i.e. other audit firms aside from Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC and Mazars) has fallen since the EU introduced mandatory audit rotation in 2013. Moreover, in the Netherlands in recent years the number of audit firms licensed to audit PIE entities has been reduced from 10 to 6 audit firms.

**Question 12. To which extent you agree to the following statements?**

	1 (strongly disagree)	2 (rather disagree)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather agree)	5 (strongly agree)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Statutory audits contribute as much as is possible to the quality and reliability of corporate reporting by PIEs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. I am satisfied with the role of the statutory auditors / audit firms of PIEs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
III. The work of auditors is reliable so I trust their assessment and reports and their work inspires trust in capital markets	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
IV. There is not enough choice for public interest entities in finding an audit firm at appropriate costs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
V. Joint audits contribute to the quality of audit	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**12.1 If you want to add any comments, and/or mention specific issues you see you can insert them here. Where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We are concerned about any possible mandatory requirement for joint audits. Several academic studies point out that there is no empirical support that joint audits lead to better audit quality. Moreover, in its 2020 report, H3C indicated that deficiencies from applying the cross-review process between the joint auditors was one of the top 10 recurring areas of inspection findings.

Mandatory joint audits have been tried in several countries and the only major countries to have retained the system are France and South Africa (the latter solely for a limited sector, same as Bulgaria); others such as Canada and Denmark abandoned the system due to the increased costs outweighing any potential benefits. Several recent academic papers provide evidence that joint audits increase audit fees for companies with estimates ranging from 10% to as high as 70%.

The delivery of joint audits creates significant challenges as each audit firm has uniquely designed systems of quality management, audit methodologies and technology platforms designed to ensure high quality and efficient audits. The increased use of proprietary audit technology will intensify the challenges of conducting a joint audit and lessen incentives for innovation. Splitting the audit in a joint audit creates significant risks to audit quality as these robust systems are designed for complete audits not partial audits.

If applied in combination with mandatory rotation, joint audit would create additional restrictions on choice, while the diverse legal systems in EU countries also create further complications.

Companies already have the option to appoint joint auditors and in many Member States are incentivised through longer auditor tenure. The uptake is low, indicating a lack of perceived benefits by companies, those charged with governance and investors. We believe that the choice should be left to those charged with governance.

The audit quality issues that occur most often at EU level are

- deficiencies in audit firms' internal quality control systems
- the lack of, or inappropriate, monitoring of high-risk audited entities
- and the lack of audit evidence and documentation.

**Question 13. To what extent can these quality issues be attributed to deficiencies in the EU legal and supervisory framework for statutory audit?**

- 1 - Not at all
- 2 - To a limited extent
- 3 - To some extent
- 4 - To a large extent
- 5 - To a very large extent



- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**Question 13.1 Please explain, and where possible, provide evidence for your assessment under question 13:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We strongly disagree with any inference that a relatively small number of corporate failures (driven overwhelmingly by actions by company management, rather than their auditors) is indicative of a widespread problem with audit quality. As auditors, we regularly identify issues as part of our work and ensure that these issues are appropriately addressed, and remedial action and training is implemented.

The current corporate reporting frameworks have evolved significantly. This has resulted in a set of standards which are very complex, include significant estimates and judgements often requiring an assessment of forward-looking financial and operational information and which can be challenging to prepare, verify and audit.

There are increasing expectations from a variety of stakeholders for the audit product to go beyond an opinion on the financial statements only and cover a broader range of issues connected with the company's performance and health. Requirements are likely to evolve over time (e.g. a company's corporate responsibility performance) and vary by industry, so requirements for audit should remain flexible.

Audit firms are investing significantly in technology, innovation, and their system of quality control to become a system of quality management as required by ISQM1. ISQM1 is designed to move audit firms' culture and processes to a system that anticipates change, evaluates risks, learns from deficiencies identified and continually enhances processes to new higher standards of quality management. We believe the resulting impact on quality will be significant over time.

In addition, ensuring that firms are able to attract and retain high quality talent is essential to deliver high quality audits. Audit firms continue to invest significantly to attract and continuously train the high calibre talent needed for complex audits.

**Question 14. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality of statutory audits of PIEs?**

**a) Ask auditors to disclose how they have assured the directors' statement on material fraud, and what steps they have taken to assess the effectiveness of the relevant internal controls and to detect any fraud**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**b) Strengthen the informational value of audit reports**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) Improve the internal governance of audit firms**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**d) Incentivise or mandate the performance of joint audits for PIEs, including to enhance competition on the PIE audit market**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**e) Further harmonise the rules on mandatory rotation**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**f) Limit the scope for statutory auditors and audit firms to provide non-audit services**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**g) Increase or eliminate caps on auditor liability, at least for cases of gross negligence of statutory auditors**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



**h) Limit the number of Member State options in the EU Audit framework to ensure consistency across the EU and to incentivise cross-border statutory audits**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**i) The creation of a passporting system for PIE auditors and audit firms, allowing auditors to provide their services across the Union based on their approval in a Member State**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 14.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of statutory audits of PIEs?**

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**14.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 14.1:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

We support:

- Greater transparency through:
  - auditors providing more clarity in the audit report on audit process and judgement used, and working with regulators to ensure greater consistency in EU
  - consistent with ISQM1, articulation of audit quality measures across the EU and in concert with other jurisdictions around the world; exploring greater use of Audit Quality Indicators at firm or engagement level
  - publication of audit firm inspection results (on audited entity and individual auditor non-identifiable basis) if EU audit regulators adopt a harmonised EU-wide inspection methodology, findings taxonomy and risk approach
- Clarifications of:
  - auditors' role and responsibilities (scope of audit, fraud and going concern)
  - company boards/directors' roles and responsibilities
  - distinct liability regimes for auditors and directors
- EU wide harmonisation of:
  - mandatory firm rotation, without reducing the mandatory rotation below 10 years (or below 24 years in the case of joint audit)
  - more consistent, timely and transparent auditor oversight reporting, including definition of regulators' findings (both severity and nature),
  - definition of audit and assurance services and prohibited services for PIE audited entities including clear and uniform list of prohibited services plus the general principles of independence
- Auditor assurance on management/board statement on ICs over financial reporting (could be limited in scope to specific PIEs e.g. PIEs included in EU/Member States' main stock indexes, systemic financial institutions and other high risk PIEs)

Clarifications on Q14:

- a) dependent on company/board requirements
- c) significant investment in system of quality management as required by ISQM1
- d) see Q12.1
- f) simplification and consistency across Member States
- g) barrier to entry, threatens audit firms' resilience and stifles innovation
- i) understanding cultural norms, business practices, laws and regulations is key

**Question 14.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

## Part IV - Supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms

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National competent authorities are responsible for the approval and registration of statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of audit standards, quality assurance and investigative and administrative disciplinary systems.

At European level, the cooperation between competent authorities is organised within the framework of the [Committee of European Audit Oversight Bodies \(the 'CEAOB'\)](#). The CEAOB has different tasks aimed at supervisory convergence, but it has no power to take binding decisions (Article 30 [Audit Regulation](#)).

**Question 15. How do you assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence of the key features of the EU supervisory framework for PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?**

### a) The supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms in the EU

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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**b) The establishment and operation of national audit oversight bodies**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) The Member State systems for investigations and sanctions**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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**d) The role of the CEAOB**

	1 (very low)	2 (low)	3 (medium)	4 (high)	5 (very high)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness in reaching its objectives	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency: has the framework been cost efficient	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
III. Coherence with relevant EU rules	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 15.1 Please describe the main issues you see, if any, in relation to the supervision of statutory auditors and audit firms and, where possible, please provide concrete examples and evidence supporting your assessment. You may want to consider the following aspects**

- **are there factors that have reduced the effectiveness / rendered the relevant EU framework less effective than anticipated? Which rules have proven less effective than anticipated?**
- **is there scope to improve efficiency via further simplification?**
- **are existing provisions coherent with each other?**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Note that, as for all questions, our reply is a pan-EU reply, reflecting views on the overall picture of auditor supervision in the EU.

The main issues that we see are:

- a lack of common interpretation and implementation of audit standards and regulation by regulators across the EU
- a variety of methodologies/processes for inspections and investigation across the EU, which lead to inconsistency, extra costs and an inability for supervisors to leverage the key findings
- audit regulators' reporting on audit quality lacks consistency and is not always timely and transparent
- inspection findings do not necessarily give a view of the quality of the firm's overall system of quality and risk management, nor reflect any remedial action by the auditor
- a need for a clearer separation in every Member State between the different roles: setting audit standards, inspection, investigations and sanctions

Varying inspection rules and reporting of inspection results can also impact stakeholder confidence and knowledge about the value of audit, thereby limiting confidence in the reliability of financial reporting and its role in informing the market and protecting investors.

**Question 16. Considering the findings in the [Commission monitoring report](#) and reports of national audit oversight bodies how would you rate the quality of audit supervision?**

- 1 - Very low
- 2 - Low
- 3 - Medium
-

- 4 - High
- 5 - Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**16.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 16, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

There are significant differences among Member State auditor oversight authorities' level of resources, experience and maturity, as well as differences in the respective listed entity and PIE markets.

**Question 17. How effective and efficient would the following actions be to increase the quality and effectiveness of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?**



**a) Ensure better the independence and appropriate resources of supervisors of auditors and audit firms**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**b) Increase the transparency of audit supervisors**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) Increase the consistency of supervision of cross-border networks of audit firms**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**d) Ensure supervision of audit committees**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**e) Harmonise and strengthen the investigation and sanctioning powers of audit supervisors**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**f) Ensure that at European level there are legal instruments available that ensure supervisory convergence as regards statutory audit of PIEs**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**g) Grant a European body the task to register and supervise PIE statutory auditors and audit firms**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 17.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of supervision of PIE statutory auditors and audit firms?**

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**17.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 17.1:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

As from this year, auditors of PIEs will comply with ISQM1. This will be reflected in firms' transparency reports. We see benefits in, consistent with ISQM1, articulation of audit quality measures across the EU and in concert with other jurisdictions around the world (see Q4.1).

We support publication of external inspection results, providing the following conditions are met:

- EU audit regulators adopt a harmonised EU-wide inspection methodology
- clarity on the definition of a finding
- no identification of individual engagements or individual auditors
- the regime to include a remedial period for the audit firm and no publication of a finding relating to the quality control system if remedied, or at least a mention of remedial action taken
- inspections to focus both on the systems of quality and risk management and on individual engagements.

While we understand that audit supervisory action is necessarily determined by Member States' legal and administrative regimes, we would support some common EU principles on audit supervision, such as due process and the possibility to appeal sanctions before court.

We also support a robust auditor oversight framework at EU level, including increased powers for the EU audit oversight body, and an enhanced role for colleges of national audit supervisors and more cooperation between with EU supervisory authorities.

We also suggest that the EU oversight body engage in multi-stakeholder dialogue, including through public consultation on proposed guidance.

**Question 17.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.



## Part V - Supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting

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The supervision and enforcement of corporate reporting refers to the examination by competent authorities of listed companies' compliance with the disclosure obligations stemming from the applicable reporting framework, as well as taking appropriate measures when infringements are identified.

Based on enforcement activities by national competent authorities, ESMA reports a significant level of material misstatements. In the follow up of the Wirecard case and based on its experience, ESMA recommended a number of actions to improve the enforcement of corporate reporting ([see ESMA letter of 26 February 2021 to the Commissioner McGuinness on next steps following Wirecard - ESMA32-51-818](#)).

The [Transparency Directive](#) includes a number of requirements relating to supervision of corporate reporting

- the designation of a central competent authority in each Member State. For the enforcement of corporate reporting, Member States may designate a competent authority other than the central authority and/or delegate tasks to other entities
- national central competent authorities must be independent from market participants. There are no specific provisions as regards the independence of other designated authorities. As regards entities with delegated tasks, the entity in question must be organised in a manner such that conflicts of interest are avoided and information obtained from carrying out the delegated tasks is not used unfairly or to prevent competition
- Member States must provide competent authorities with certain powers, including investigative powers
- ESMA is tasked to foster supervisory convergence as regards the enforcement of financial statements prepared in accordance with the IFRS. For this purpose it has adopted in [2014 guidelines on the enforcement of financial information](#)

This part of the consultation complements the [Commission targeted consultation on the supervisory convergence and the Single Rulebook](#) from 12 March 2021 to 21 May 2021.

**Question 18. Considering the level of material departures from IFRS in the financial statements of listed companies found in the [ESMA report on enforcement and regulatory activities of European enforcers in 2020](#), how would you rate (on a scale of 1 to 5) the degree to which such departures can be attributed to deficiencies in the EU supervisory framework?**

- 1 - Very low
- 2 - Low
- 3 - Medium
- 4 - High
- 5 - Very high
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**18.1 If you want to add any comments and/or provide evidence for your assessment in question 18, you can provide it below. You may also include the consequences that your assessment of the quality of audit supervision or the lack thereof has:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

Overall, the supervisory framework and infrastructure for supervision of financial reporting (combination of NCAs and ESMA) works appropriately. See suggestions for improvements at Q19.

Regarding the ESMA report, it is unclear what NCAs have considered to be “material departure from IFRS”. We note that only 1 % of enforcement actions of ex-post examinations led to a restatement of financial statements and 7 % to a publication of a corrective note. 79% of the enforcement actions rather led to a request for correction in future financial statements. It would be interesting to have an analysis of enforcement actions by type of companies (large, SMEs).

IFRS require application of judgment, which includes some subjectivity, particularly in determining whether certain disclosures are material (about 60% of NCAs’ enforcement actions relate to disclosures). Also, in recent years, some new standards that are complex and require a learning curve have been implemented, which may have an impact on how compliance is judged.

Regulators and auditors may have different assessments of materiality in carrying out their duties. Whilst departures from IFRS identified by auditors are always communicated to management (and audit committees when they exist), financial statements may not always be corrected accordingly. An audit report will include a qualification only when the departure is considered to be material to the financial statements as a whole. The ESMA report does not reflect whether the auditors had also identified the departures (for example, through a representation letter or in the summary of uncorrected misstatements).

As acknowledged in ESMA’s report (p.78), NCAs across the EU do not have the same tools/means to adjust /take enforcement actions. More harmonisation of NCAs’ practices and enforcement actions would benefit the value and reliability of financial statements in the EU.

**Question 19. How effective and efficient would the following actions be in increasing the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?**

**a) Clarify the role and responsibilities of the national authorities charged with the enforcement of corporate reporting and entities to whom the supervision of corporate reporting is delegated/designated, and improve their cooperation**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**b) Improve the system for the exchange of information between authorities and entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting, and other relevant national authorities**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**c) Strengthen the rules ensuring the independence of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**d) Increase the resources of national authorities or entities involved in the supervision of corporate reporting**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**e) Increase the powers for national competent authorities to enforce corporate reporting, such as forensic, powers to obtain any necessary information from banks, tax or any other authorities in the country, powers to request information and corrective actions, etc.**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**f) Improve cooperation and coordination between national authorities of different Member States**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



**g) Increase transparency on the conduct and results of enforcement activities by national authorities**

	1 (not at all effective/ efficient)	2 (rather not effective/ efficient)	3 (neutral)	4 (rather effective/ efficient)	5 (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**h) Strengthen the role of ESMA on the enforcement of corporate reporting**

	<b>1</b> (not at all effective/ efficient)	<b>2</b> (rather not effective/ efficient)	<b>3</b> (neutral)	<b>4</b> (rather effective/ efficient)	<b>5</b> (very effective/ efficient)	Don't know - No opinion - Not applicable
I. Effectiveness	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
II. Efficiency in term of cost/benefits of action	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

**Question 19.1 Have you identified other actions that would effectively and efficiently increase the quality and reliability of reporting by listed companies?**

- Yes
- No
- Don't know / no opinion / not applicable

**19.1.1 Please specify to what other action(s) you refer in your answer to question 19.1:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

As priority actions, we support:

- a) Clearer and more harmonised supervisory enforcement rules and actions, as well as practices, across EU jurisdictions. This may require changes to legislation including NCAs applying more emphasis on risks and the performance of companies (as is the case for the financial sector) and enhanced coordination /supervision of NCAs by ESMA
- b) Increased or continued dialogue between auditors and NCAs/ESMA, on a collective and/or individual issuers' basis, to enhance preventive measures rather than corrective actions. We suggest assessing whether there is a common and consistent understanding and application across the EU of Article 12.1 of the EU Audit Regulation on the auditor's duty to report information to the NCA. Our empirical evidence indicates that this may not be the case.
- c) Increased dialogue between supervisory authorities at a local and EU level (e.g. ESMA / CEAOB / European Banking Authority (EBA) / European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) / European Central Bank (ECB) etc.)
- d) NCAs and ESMA to provide more granular analysis of how reviews of corporate reporting are carried out, and what/where deficiencies are observed (e.g. by type of companies...)
- e) NCAs to communicate systematically their enforcement actions to the issuer's audit committee and its auditor
- f) Consistent independence and objectivity requirements for oversight bodies and their staff

With respect to sustainability reporting supervision, the same infrastructure (NCAs plus ESMA) and functioning should apply as for financial reporting. This requires that both NCAs and ESMA have sufficient resources across the EU for high quality and consistent supervision of the non-financial statements, particularly in the context of the upcoming CSRD.

**Question 19.2 Please provide any details to support your views. Any evidence, including on expected benefits and costs of such action is welcome:**

*2000 character(s) maximum*

including spaces and line breaks, i.e. stricter than the MS Word characters counting method.

## Additional information

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Should you wish to provide additional information (e.g. a position paper, report) or raise specific points not covered by the questionnaire, you can upload your additional document(s) below. **Please make sure you do not include any personal data in the file you upload if you want to remain anonymous.**

The maximum file size is 1 MB.

You can upload several files.

Only files of the type pdf,txt,doc,docx,odt,rtf are allowed

**3e4a880b-8db7-4972-8aa6-d36bf36e1ab4/22\_02\_04\_Deloitte\_EC\_consultation\_Corporate\_Reporting.pdf**

### Useful links

[More on this consultation \(https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-corporate-reporting\\_en\)](https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/finance-consultations-2021-corporate-reporting_en)

[Consultation document \(https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-document\\_en\)](https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-document_en)

[Consultation strategy \(https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-strategy\\_en\)](https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/2021-corporate-reporting-consultation-strategy_en)

[More on company reporting \(https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing\\_en\)](https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reporting-and-auditing_en)

[Specific privacy statement \(https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/specific-privacy-statement\\_en\)](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/specific-privacy-statement_en)

[More on the Transparency register \(http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en\)](http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?locale=en)

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