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Technical appendix

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Contents

Glossary

Acronym/Abbreviation	Full name
ABARES	Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences
AR6	Sixth Assessment Report
BEA	Bureau of Economic Analysis
CCUS	Carbon capture, utilisation and storage
CGE	Computable general equilibrium
CMIP6	Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6
CO_2	Carbon dioxide
COP26	Conference of Parties (26th)
DAE-RGEM	Deloitte Access Economics Regional General Equilibrium Model
ERP	Emissions response parameter
GCM	Global climate model
GDP	Gross domestic product
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GSAT	Global-mean surface air temperature
GTAP	Global Trade Analysis Project
GVA	Gross value added
IAM	Integrated assessment model
IEA	International Energy Agency
IIASA	International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LGA	Local Government Area
LECZ	Low-elevation coastal zone
LULUCF	Land use, land-use change and forestry
MAGICC	Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change
RCP	Representative Concentration Pathway
SAM	Social accounting matrix
SLR	Sea-level rise
SSP	Shared Socioeconomic Pathway
WBGT	Wet Bulb Globe Temperature
WGI	Working Group I

Turning point: The economics of climate change

This technical appendix is a supporting document to Aotearoa New Zealand's Turning Point report.

Modelling the economic impacts of the physical risks from climate change, and the economic impacts of mitigation and adaptation pathways, can be fraught but is not insurmountable. The economics discipline has spent several decades debating the benefits and limitations of the established techniques to derive economic estimates. To this day, while there remain many uncertainties and technical limitations on what macroeconomic models can reasonably conclude, economic techniques have improved to integrate views of the physical climate and economies and provide important insights into the choices that can be made to drive prosperity.

The Deloitte Economics Institute recognises the uncertainties and technical challenges in quantifying relationships between green house gas emissions, global surface temperatures, and economic impacts. The use of integrated assessment modelling (IAMs) presents one framework and approach to addressing these questions, but, like any method, comes with limitations (see Section 5). But equally, we recognise that economics can provide useful insights for decision-making today. This report does not discount the pragmatic in pursuit of the perfect.

In this context, the economic modelling conducted in this analysis has several objectives that seek to address those limitations:

- The results provide an order of magnitude impact on gross domestic product (GDP) and other economic variables out to 2050. These results should not be interpreted as predictions or "most likely" estimates of climate change impacts. The modelling instead provides a consistent framework through which to understand the economic difference between possible future worlds: one with significant climate change impacts and one with more moderate effects. Establishing a long-term view of impact, albeit limited to precise scenario specifications, enables us to draw conclusions about trade-offs and the direction of change in economies. This is true for both high emissions, high temperature increase pathways and low emissions, lower temperature increase pathways.
- In the absence of transformation, a pathway of higher emissions and higher global surface temperature is the baseline outlook for the world. That in turn creates climate change-induced economic damages. While there are several probable scenarios for emissions profiles and corresponding temperature increases (all of which would result in some climate change damage), we adopt a single, higher-emission and higher temperature future pathway (see section 2.1) that offers the basis for an integrated view of chronic physical damages becoming a trend. This baseline outlook is used to demonstrate that choosing a path of inadequate action is not costless.[1] Economic growth will not occur uninterrupted as the climate changes.
- In reference to this baseline outlook, an assessment of the costs and benefits of mitigation and adaptation can be considered. To inform this, we model a single pathway of economic transformation that decouples emissions from the system of economic production. This pathway decarbonises economies to reach a near net-zero greenhouse gas emission profile and limits global surface temperature warming to close to 1.5°C. Like the baseline scenario, this decarbonisation pathway is taken as a given — we do not assign a probability to it being realised. Rather, the focus is on the sequencing, pace and scale of economic actions that could enable economies to decarbonise within a carbon budget that limits global surface temperature warming to well below 2°C by 2050.

Economic analysis of climate change is important to reframe the debate and inform decision-making today, while being mindful of the limitations of both science and economics.

Governments, businesses, and communities are making choices today about how to address climate change. COP 27, the global climate summit in Egypt, catalysed enhanced emissions reduction commitments in many major economies. To meet the stated commitments, leaders will be required to make a number of choices, and economic analysis accounting for the climate is a key input into these choices. If we can't reframe the starting point — that inadequate action comes with significant economic costs — then any action on climate change will always appear as an unnecessary cost to society and economies.

Any economic change will have a cost attached to it — whether that is a change in the climate or a change to decarbonise. It is about how we understand the potential magnitude of those costs, the options to minimise them, and how the choices we all make today determine the extent of them. There is a narrow—and closing—window of time to create a new engine for sustainable economic prosperity while preventing the worst consequences of a warming world.

1 Definitions

1.1 Net zero

Net zero refers to achieving an overall balance between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions produced and GHG emissions taken out of the atmosphere. Deloitte Economics has modelled a scenario that reflects the world reaching net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. Of this, around 5.5Gt (or around 8%) of CO_2 is expected to be offset or captured via carbon sinks in 2050.

1.2 Close-to-1.5°C world

This pathway to net zero for the world limits global average warming to well below 2°C and close to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, in alignment with current Paris Agreement objectives. The precise warming in global average mean surface temperature used in modelling peaks at 1.7°C above pre-industrial levels around 2040, which declines to approximately 1.2°C by 2100. The socioeconomic and emissions pathways underpinning this scenario are broadly consistent with the SSP1-1.9 scenario (see section 2.5).

The climatic and economic implications of this global temperature pathway are modelled as the comparison scenario to a world of climate inadequate action.

1.3 3°C world

An economic scenario that relates to a pathway of climate inadequate action. The socioeconomic and emissions pathways underpinning this scenario are broadly consistent with the SSP2-4.5 scenario (see section 2.5). The implied temperature change is 2.7°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.

1.4 Turning point concept

Transitioning to a net-zero world and limiting warming to as close to 1.5°C requires an industrial and economic transformation that would typically occur over a century to take place in just three decades. The turning point concept highlights that, despite initial costs, countries and industries will see dividends to rapid decarbonisation. It is a climatic and economic turning point in that the worst effects of climate change are avoided, while the economic benefits of new industries and technologies offset the costs of transitioning away from emissions-intensive production processes.

1.5 Deviations from baseline

The turning point narrative is based on scenario analysis. The modelling does not provide a forecast of the future, but rather comparisons between possible future worlds. The discussion of modelling results will usually describe the state of the economy in reference to an alternative future or the deviation in a variable (like GDP) from one scenario (i.e., a close-to-1.5°C world) to another (i.e., a 3°C world).

1.6 Climate change impacts

When comparing two alternative futures, a lower GDP at the same point in time is not the same as having negative GDP growth. The example in figure 1.1 comparing two GDP scenarios with and without the impacts of climate change shows that both scenarios reflect an economy that is still growing. The impact or "loss" of GDP in 2050 due to climate change is the difference between the two GDP levels.

Figure 1.1. Accounting for climate change impacts



Note: This data is illustrative only.
Source: Deloitte Economics.

1.6.1 Net-zero deviations from a damaged baseline

When considering the costs and benefits of actions to reduce emissions, an appropriate economic baseline would reflect the damages that would arise under a world that continued to warm due to unconstrained GHG emissions. In simplified form (figure 1.2), the "corrected" growth path represents a baseline against which a net-zero scenario (with lower damages) can be compared. The policy scenario (section 3) estimates deviations of a close-to-1.5°C world compared to a 3°C world.

Figure 1.2. Net-zero scenario impacts compared to a climate-damaged baseline



Note: This data is illustrative only.
Source: Deloitte Economics.

1.7 Decarbonisation

The modelling represents decarbonisation in a particular way. The emissions intensity of energy commodity use does not change, but industrial composition and production processes adapt to rely less on emissions-intensive energy commodity use, thus making production less emissions-intensive overall.

1.8 Clean energy and electricity

Clean electricity includes sources like solar, wind, hydropower, and geothermal production technologies. Zero-emission hydrogen and bioenergy are combined with clean electricity to be described as clean energy (see 2.4.3).

1.9 Conventional energy and electricity

Includes coal, oil, and gas as fuels and energy production as well as their use in electricity production. Carbon capture, use, and storage is not separately modelled.

2 D.Climate modeling

2.1 Overview

To date, most macroeconomic models and economic policy analyses are considered against a "baseline" that assumes economic growth will occur unhindered by rising concentrations of GHGs in the world's atmosphere. Deloitte Economics believes that this viewpoint does not hold true in practice — particularly in the long run — and therefore economic analysis and climate policy is informed by a dated theoretical framework.

Climate change impacts should not be considered as a scenario relative to a baseline of unconstrained emissions-intensive growth, because absent fundamental societal and economic shifts, the impacts of unmitigated climate change are the baseline. By excluding the economic impacts of climate change from economic baselines, decision-making misses a fundamental point.

A shift to understand and incorporate this climate-affected baseline into decision-making is gaining momentum. The Network for Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), made up of 92 central banks, has been a prominent example, developing guidance and scenarios to assist the financial sector to better understand its climate risks.[2]

Deloitte Economics has developed an extension of an in-house regional general equilibrium model, DAE-RGEM, giving it the functionality of a full-fledged integrated assessment model (IAM). Unlike many IAMs, this model incorporates multiple economic damages that vary by sector and region, and unlike many regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, it has full integration with the global economy through the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and a complete set of emissions accounts covering CO_2 and non-CO_2 gases.[3]

This work draws on, and contributes to, three key streams of research:

- The primary stream is that of advances in CGE models, allowing for modelling of complex and dynamic policies like those required to affect a transition to a low-carbon environment.[4]
- Another stream is advances in IAMs.[5] The IAM stream, in its initial phases, used a more aggregate representation of the economy that allowed for a stylised climate module.[6] These models sought to incorporate potential damages associated with climate change into a model of the economic system to form an integrated (but simplified) framework for assessing the decisions facing policymakers when it came to emissions reduction targets.[7]
- The third and most recent stream seeks to combine the two described above and provide the richer sectoral and policy detail of modern CGE models coupled with climate feedback mechanisms that allow for integrated assessment.[8]

D.Climate is an extension of a well-established modelling methodology and policy analysis technique that seeks to "correct" the typical business-as-usual baseline assumed in most modeling.[9]

Figure 2.1. D.Climate framework

Model	DAE - RGEM	MAGICC	Damage functions	D. Climate
Output	Economic growth and emissions pathway	Temperature pathway	Economic impacts to factors	Damaged growth path
Example	Aligned with SSP2 – 4.5	3° warming at 2100	Reduced labour productivity	GDP 5% lower at 2050
	With ‘inadequate action’ economic growth produces more greenhouse gas emissions globally.	Increased emissions result in a change in average temperature for different regions.	Average temperature change causes the climate to change. This results in physical damages to the environment and world around us.	Climate change damage impacts how land is use, how people work and how money is spent in the economy. This negatively impacts economic growth.

Note: The temperature pathways provided by MAGICC is global-mean surface air temperature. The damage functions estimate regional impacts based on this temperature pathway as well as other regional climate variables (e.g., precipitation), which are not provided by MAGICC.
Source: Deloitte Economics, Meinshausen et al. (2011, 2020), Nicholls et al. (2021).

D.Climate is built on an economic modelling framework that accounts for the economic impacts of climate change and establishes a reference case that can be modelled out to the year 2100 or beyond. The D.Climate process and logic are as follows:

1. The modelling produces a baseline economic growth path that draws on short- to medium-term global and regional forecasts in combination with a long-run assumption of contraction and convergence.
2. The baseline economic growth path has an associated emissions growth path—derived from the established link between economic activity and emissions — that corresponds to atmospheric GHG concentrations rising in line with SSP2-4.5.
3. Rising atmospheric concentrations of GHGs cause global warming above pre-industrial levels, as projected by a reduced complexity climate model, the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC).[10]
4. Warming causes shifts in global climate patterns and results in damages to the factors of production (capital, labour and land) and their productivities.
5. Damages to factors of production are distributed across the economy, impacting GDP.
6. These feedbacks are fed back into the model to determine the deviation in economic activity associated with a given level of warming (i.e. the damages).

Translating this concept into a modelling process involves three models linked through three key outputs. Deloitte Economics’ approach extends methods adopted by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES), the IPCC, and other research organisations. The method is extended by necessity for practical public policy purposes and the modelling is regionalised—allowing results and insights to be produced at more granular geographic levels (such as countries or subnational regions).

The modelling process is summarised as follows:

1. Deloitte’s in-house regional general equilibrium model (DAE-RGEM) is used to produce a projected path for economic output and emissions that align with a chosen shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP).

2. For each scenario, the associated climate data (global annual surface temperature increases and atmospheric concentrations) is sourced from a climate change model: MAGICC version 7.[11] Separately,

regional average temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity variables are sourced from a synthesis of the models available from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6).[12]

3. This climate data is then fed into damage functions to inform how shifts in temperature may play out in terms of impacts on the stocks and productivities of factors of production in each sector/region. Unlike most other models, we model multiple damages, including capital damages, sea-level rise (SLR) damages to land stock, heat stress damages on labour productivity, human health damages to labour productivity, agricultural damages from changes in crop yields and tourism damages to net inflow of foreign currency.

2.2 Baseline economic assumptions

The baseline includes a set of assumptions about macroeconomic growth rates and technological improvements between 2015 and 2050. These key variables have been calibrated drawing on historical and forecast time series from a range of reputable sources.

2.3 Macroeconomic variables

Macroeconomic variables including GDP, population and labour supply and unemployment rate are exogenous for each year over the model period.

Growth rates for GDP are based on data from the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) World Economic Outlook database, which provides historical and forecast GDP growth over the period 1980 to 2025.[13] These growth rates are extrapolated using historical growth rates and assuming a degree of convergence over the long run.

Population growth rates are calibrated using the total population trajectories of the second shared socioeconomic pathway (SSP2) made available by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). A linear interpolation is applied to build yearly data.[14] Changes to labour supply are estimated by employing a similar approach and are assumed to broadly reflect trends in population growth.

Unemployment rates are based on short-term forecasts developed by the IMF[15] and extrapolated using a moving average. This approach implicitly assumes a steady-state unemployment rate over the medium to long term.

2.3.1 Emissions, energy efficiency, and productivity improvements

Shocks in the first year of the simulation are used to match the observed energy mix for each region to ensure an accurate reflection of the current state of the energy mix between renewable and traditional sources. Energy mix data is drawn from OurWorldInData.org.[16]

A uniform energy-efficiency improvement (0.55% per annum[17]) is applied across all regions, reflecting a continuation of the long-run improvement observed to date.

2.4 Database: Regions and sectors

The core economic data underpinning DAE-RGEM — the social accounting matrix (SAM) — is sourced from the GTAP database.[18] This economic data is supplemented with specific data on electricity, differentiated by power-generation type (coal, gas, solar, etc.) from the GTAP satellite database, GTAP-Power, as well as CO_2 and non-CO_2 emissions data.[19] The behavioural parameters are also sourced from GTAP for the most part, with some exceptions as discussed next.

2.4.1 Regional aggregation

D.Climate is a global model and can be tailored to a specified regional concordance in line with the GTAP database.[20] For this project, New Zealand was isolated in the model with four regional aggregations modelled within this geographical area (table 2.1).

Table 2.1. Regional concordance

Reported subregion name	Country or area	GTAP abbreviations
New Zealand	New Zealand	NZ
Australia	Australia	AUS

Reported subregion name	Country or area	GTAP abbreviations
Asia-Pacific	All other Asia and Pacific countries excluding New Zealand and Australia	APAC
Rest of world	All others	ROW

Source: Deloitte Economics.

2.4.2 Sectoral aggregation

D.Climate can also be tailored to a specified sectoral concordance in line with the GTAP database.[21] For this report, the following sectoral aggregation was chosen, and there was a specific effort made to distinguish two non-GTAP sectors (hydrogen and bioenergy) to aid in the representation of the transition to net zero.

The sectoral concordance for this report is presented under the **Appendix**.

2.4.3 Commodity splits

To provide greater granularity representing the transition to net zero, the hydrogen and bioenergy sectors were split from their parent sector of "petroleum, coal products". This process was required, as the GTAP database does not specifically identify either of these emerging energy sectors individually.

The petroleum, coal products sector was targeted as the parent sector due to the similarities in its sales structure to that of hydrogen and bioenergy. This transformation was based on information gathered on the current size of the hydrogen, bioenergy and petroleum and (in regions outside of New Zealand) coking sectors, as well as the respective cost and sales structures of each individual sector. The split was executed so as to maintain the following conditions:

- The size of the hydrogen sector in New Zealand is approximately 1.4% of the parent sector (petroleum, coal products). Its cost structure is different in that it draws more heavily on coal and P_C (the parent sector itself; petroleum, coal products), although there is sufficient flexibility in its production function to allow for a shift toward using zero-emission electricity and primary factors as the main inputs. The sales structure is the same as its parent.
- The size of the bioenergy sector in New Zealand is approximately 0.4% of the parent sector (petroleum, coal products). It relies solely on the output of agriculture and waste as inputs to production in conjunction with primary factors. The sales structure is the same as its parent. This is a subset of the broader bioenergy sector as it is exclusively carbon-neutral.
- The remaining P_C sector is essentially the same as the original GTAP sector, but slightly smaller.

There is scope for further refinement of this process, drawing on more detailed data to help get a better picture of production, consumption, and export, specifically at the detailed regional level.

2.5 Physical climate modeling for D.Climate

The future of climate change contains key uncertainties. The rate at which CO_2 and other pollutants accumulate in Earth's atmosphere could follow a number of trajectories, with each leading to a range of physical climate effects varying in both scope and scale. What is certain, however, is that the average global temperature has been rising and will likely continue to rise until a sustained and concerted effort is made to decarbonise globally.

In 2011, a set of four emissions and warming pathways were published to support consistent scenario analysis in the climate modelling community.[22] These representative concentration pathways (RCPs) were selected as plausible future GHG emissions and atmospheric concentration trajectories extending out to 2100. They are:

- RCP2.6 (assumes stringent decarbonisation),
- RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 (two central scenarios), and
- RCP8.5 (a high GHG emissions scenario).

The IPCC's Fifth assessment report of 2014 adopted these RCPs as core scenarios for long-term projections and assessments.

In 2017, a concurrent research effort sought to develop a similar set of consistent future scenarios for human development — the five shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs).[23] These include a range of societal factors such as demographics, human development (for example, health and education), economic growth, inequality, governance, technological change, and policy orientations.[24] The five SSPs are:

- SSP1–Sustainability
- SSP2–Middle of the Road
- SSP3–Regional Rivalry
- SSP4–Inequality
- SSP5–Fossil-fuelled Development.

Neither RCPs nor SSPs are "complete" without the other. RCPs generate climate projections that do not correspond to specific societal pathways. SSPs provide alternative societal futures, where climate change impacts and policies are not present. Thus, it is increasingly common to find research, including the IPCC's Sixth assessment report (AR6), adopting an integrated SSP-RCP scenario framework.[25] The five core scenarios that feature in the IPCC AR6 Working Group I (WGI) report are:

- SSP1-1.9 (very low emissions)
- SSP1-2.6 (low emissions)
- SSP2-4.5 (medium emissions)
- SSP3-7.0 (high emissions)
- SSP5-8.5 (very high emissions).

The computational demands of the climate models in this report limit a detailed analysis of a wider range of scenarios, although other scenarios feature in certain sections. The feasibility or likelihood of any of these scenarios is not part of the IPCC's assessment.[26]

Following this SSP-RCP framework, data consistent with the SSP2-4.5 represents the baseline state in the Turning Point series. The SSP2 narrative reflects a continuation of current social, economic, and technological trends, as well as slow global progress toward achieving sustainable development goals[27], while SSP1-19 best aligns with the Deloitte Economics' view of a scenario with adequate action.

SSP2 assumes socioeconomic trends do not shift markedly from historical patterns and emissions continue to 2100.[28] The more climatically extreme scenarios include socioeconomic futures SSP3 Regional Rivalry and SSP5 Fossil-fuelled Development as part of SSP3-7.0 and SSP5-8.5 respectively. These socioeconomic futures generate higher global warming outcomes than a 'Middle of the Road', SSP2, scenario would assume and are therefore both relevant for consideration in a review of the physical science of climate change and the risks of higher emissions. These SSPs, however, do not align with the Deloitte Economics view of a baseline future.

The SSP2 scenario featured in IPCC AR6 WGI, SSP2-4.5, projects an emissions pathway that plateaus by mid-century and then declining to 2100. Emissions pathways like RCPs 6.0, and 8.5 continue to rise to the end of the century, consistent with the Deloitte Economics baseline view of inadequate action. While RCP8.5 is a possible future emissions scenario, it is considered a high-emissions no-policy future. It relies on a combination of assumptions, like rapid population growth and a persistent increase in coal use to 2100, that appear increasingly less likely given recent policy and technological developments.[29] Scenarios that use lower RCPs, like 6.0, can therefore be considered more appropriate inaction baselines, noting that worse future scenarios, like RCP8.5, are still possible.

2.5.1 Climate of global average temperature increase—MAGICC

Emissions produced by Deloitte's DAE-RGEM model are translated into global-mean surface air temperature (GSAT) relative to the pre-industrial (1750) period based on these emissions trajectories using a reduced complexity climate model. Specifically, the D.Climate framework uses outputs from the MAGICC as described in Meinshausen et al. (2011) and Meinshausen et al. (2020), and configured by Nicholls et al (2021).[30] Global temperature increases are the main driver of climate impacts and are regionalised via the damage functions. MAGICC does not provide regional temperature outputs or regional climate impacts.

2.5.2 Other climate variables—CMIP6

Separately, regional average temperature, precipitation, and relative humidity variables—specifically Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT)—have also been used. The data for each variable is the multi-model mean of 17 global climate models (GCMs) for the modeled SSP-RCP future pathways available from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 6 (CMIP6).[31] The GCMs output was downloaded from the Earth System Grid Federation portal and then processed into monthly periods per geography/region across the modelled regions from present day to 2100.[32]

Twenty-year averages of the GCM projections are used here to assess the key signals for future climate change across short- to long-term horizons. Each 20-year averaged period represents the climate of the midyear. For example, the average temperature projection for the period 2011 to 2030 is assumed to represent the climate in the 2020 horizon.

2.5.3 Damage function overview

The fundamental driver of economic damages is rising temperature. As rising temperature induces climate change, economic output (as measured by GDP) is impacted by the physical damages that affect productivity and/or the stock of production factors.

Figure 2.2. Two-stage economic damages relationship

Source: Deloitte Economics.

This report includes six regionalised damages.

Figure 2.3. Climate Change impacts on the Economy

Climate damages

How climate change negatively impacts the economy

Heat stress
Lost labour productivity from extreme heat 'slows down' workers and reduces their ability to perform tasks

Sea level rise
Rising sea levels result in loss of productive land, both agricultural and urban, and reduced productivity of low-lying and coastal areas

Stalling productivity and investment
Economies suffer as investment goes to repairing existing assets rather than contributing to new, more productive capital

Health and wellbeing
Increased incidence of disease and mortality disrupts living standards and the lives of the working population

Tourism loss
Loss of tourism and disrupted flow of global currency circulating in economies, impacts business, jobs and livelihoods

Agricultural loss
Reduced agricultural yields from changing climate patterns

Source: Deloitte Economics.

The following section outlines each damage and how each affects the economy.

2.5.4 Heat stress damages on labour productivity

A sufficiently hot working environment can negatively affect the health and safety of workers, as well as restrict their ability to perform tasks and limit their productive capacity.[33] For jobs where tasks are performed outdoors, it can be difficult for workers to moderate their heat exposure. The same can be true for indoor jobs where air conditioning is not readily accessible.

Rising average global temperatures lead to shifts in the distribution of daily peak temperatures and relative humidity. Heat waves are likely to become more frequent and increasingly extreme for many countries.

To continue functioning at elevated body temperatures, workers can take instinctive actions to reduce their work intensity or increase the frequency of short breaks. This slowing down of activity (whether it occurs through self-instinct or occupational health management interventions) results in reduced "work capacity" and lower labour productivity.[34]

This analysis estimates the effect of rising temperatures and changing relative humidity levels on labour productivity using Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT) as a measure of heat stress. Analysis is conducted at a regional level. It is assumed that changes in labour productivity (an economic concept) are equal to changes in estimated work capacity (a physiological concept).

The methodology follows an approach proposed by Kjellstrom et al. (2017), which uses a series of functions describing the relationship between WBGT and labour productivity across three different work intensities: 200W (equivalent to light manual labour, such as office work), 300W (equivalent to moderate manual labour, such as manufacturing), and 400W (equivalent to high-intensity manual labour, such as farming). Relationships have been determined by Kjellstrom et al. (2017), based on a review of epidemiological datasets.

Workers in each GTAP sector are assumed to perform tasks at one of the three work intensities specified above. GTAP sectors have been allocated to specific work intensities based on internal advice from Deloitte subject matter experts.

Consistent with the approach proposed by Kjellstrom et al. (2017), it is assumed that a geography or region's WBGT varies over three 4-hour intervals comprising the approximate 12 hours in a working day:

1. Early morning and early evening: 4 hours at WBGT mean (calculated using average monthly temperature)
2. Middle of the day: 4 hours at WBGT max (calculated using average monthly maximum temperature)
3. Hours in between: 4 hours at WBGT half (calculated as the midpoint between WBGT mean and WBGT max)

These three variants of WBGT have been projected at monthly intervals using the simplified WBGT index—sWBGT—based on surface temperature and water vapour pressure (developed by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology).[35] Water vapor pressure was derived using estimates of relative humidity and the corresponding surface temperature.

Labour productivity is then estimated for each geography/region at monthly intervals, across each of the three 4-hour intervals assumed to comprise the working day. The mean of these three estimates is then taken to represent the average labour productivity for workers throughout the working day. Workers are assumed to maintain the same level of productivity for all days contained within each month. Monthly labour productivity estimates are then averaged to give an aggregate measure of labour productivity for each year in the modelling period.

2.5.5 Human health damages to labour productivity

The impacts of climate change on human health are many and complex.[36] Increasing temperatures can increase heat-related health problems, particularly for those with preestablished cardiovascular and respiratory disorders.[37] Increasing temperatures can also reduce cold-related health problems.[38]

Climate change can impact the range, abundance, and dispersion of species-carrying diseases. Studies generally agree that the prevalence of malaria increases with an increase in temperature. Other vector-borne diseases may increase or decrease.[39] Climate change would allow diseases to invade immunologically naïve populations with unprepared medical systems and would affect food- and waterborne diseases, with cholera and diarrhoea being potentially most problematic.[40]

As extreme weather events become more severe and frequent, so too does the threat they present to human populations. Climate change can affect air quality, leading to greater incidence of diseases caused by air pollution. Climate change may also affect human health indirectly, through changes in food production, water resources, migration, and economic development.[41]

Human health is therefore prominent in estimates of future climate change impacts. The welfare costs (or benefits) of health impacts contribute substantially to the total costs of climate change. Many estimates of economic damages rely on direct costs methodologies (i.e., price times quantity). With regard to human health, the price is typically equal to the value of a statistical life, based on estimates of willingness to pay to reduce the risk of death or diseases, or the willingness to accept compensation for increased risk.[42] However, these methods ignore the human health impacts on labour productivity and the demand for health services.

The approach adopted for this analysis is based on the work undertaken by Roson and Sartori (2016), which in turn is based on Bosello et al. (2006), by considering some vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue, schistosomiasis), heat- and cold-related diseases, and diarrhoea. It does not consider other diseases and impacts mentioned in the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (2014).[43]

The starting point of the analysis presented in Bosello et al. (2006) is a meta-analysis of the epidemiological, medical, and interdisciplinary literature to achieve the best estimates for the additional number of extra cases of mortality and morbidity associated with a given increase in average temperature.[44] The information obtained in this research has been combined with data on the structure of the working population to infer the number of lost working days. The changes in morbidity and mortality are interpreted as changes in labour productivity.

Roson and Sartori (2016) update the work of Bosello et al. (2006) to account for recent literature on health impacts and studies mentioned in IPCC (2014), scaling up or down the variations in labour productivity.

The results of these studies are expressed as changes in average labour productivity for a 1°C increase in temperature (implicitly assuming that the relationship is approximately linear). To understand the relationship between human health impacts, an increase in average temperature, and time, we regressed the variables to find an equation with a satisfactory fit for the relationship.

The analysis estimates the higher-order economic effects (or indirect costs) of human health impacts and variations in labour productivity. It is important to note that this methodology excludes induced demand for health care.

2.5.6 Sea-level rise damages to land and capital stock

As average global temperatures continue to rise, glaciers and polar ice are melting, and water bodies are experiencing thermal expansion. Together, these factors cause sea-level rise (SLR).

SLR can impact a geography's total stock of land (an economic factor of production) through a combination of erosion, inundation, and salt intrusion along the coastline. As the global stock of land declines due to SLR, productive activity that would otherwise occur on that land is also foregone.

The extent of land lost to SLR will depend on several geography-specific characteristics, including (i) the composition of the shoreline (cliffs and rocky coasts are less subject to erosion than sandy coasts and wetlands), (ii) the total length of the coastline, (iii) the share of the coast that is suitable for productive purposes (e.g., in agriculture or urban land), and (iv) the vertical land movement (e.g., coastal subsidence or uplift).[45]

This report estimates land area lost due to SLR using a methodology proposed by Roson and Sartori (2016), who estimated the mean SLR (in metres) associated with global-mean surface temperature change from a series of regressions based on data within the IPCC Fifth assessment report (AR5), while also accounting for vertical land movement.

The proportion of agricultural land lost per metre of SLR is then estimated based on the findings of Roson and Sartori (2016), as well as World Bank data describing the extent of low-elevation coastal zones (LECZ) for each geography or region. The proportion of LECZ used for agricultural production in each geography is assumed to be equal to the proportion of total land area used for agriculture in that same geography.

This analysis extends the Roson and Sartori (2016) methodology to also capture urban land area lost due to SLR, again leveraging World Bank data describing the extent of urban area in LECZ. In low-lying and seacoast urban areas, residential and commercial properties may incur physical damages. Economic activity that would otherwise occur in these urban areas will also need to transition to other geographies.

The process for estimating both components is as follows:

- The percentage of effective land area lost per metre of SLR is calculated by multiplying the following factors: the percentage loss in coastal wetland (a proxy for loss of land due to SLR, estimated by the HadCM3 climate model under the A1b SRES scenario),[46] the LECZ area, and the percentage of erodible coast and relevant coastline.
- Considering which proportion of total coast is suitable for agricultural (productive)/urban purposes, the percentage of effective land change is adjusted by agricultural land area/urban land area.

- The percentage change in agricultural and urban land stock is computed by multiplying the percentage of effective land change by metre of SLR and the estimated SLR.

Notably, there are a number of limitations involved with this methodology of measuring SLR. One is the assumption that the area of LECZ in each region is used for agricultural or urban purposes. This will not be true of all regions, some of which have large areas of unproductive coastal areas.

Further, the method used focuses primarily on the loss of total land stock. The method does not explicitly consider damage to labour productivity due to forced displacement and SLR damage to infrastructure, which is generally established to be higher than damage to land stock.[47] However, it is widely assumed that submergence by SLR does not lead to damages to capital, because it is a slow process, and by the time SLR arrives the capital stock will have fully depreciated and property markets will have adjusted.[48]

Further, as average SLR increases (a gradual process), the impact of extreme or acute SLR (e.g., king tides and storm surges) will cause damage that may not be fully reflected in this function.[49] Financial and asset value shocks of SLR to coastal property will also not be captured through this damage but may represent a significant economic risk if warming continues.[50]

2.5.7 Capital damages

This report captures climate-induced capital damages as a function of global-mean surface air temperature (GSAT).

Capital damages, in this context, are "measured as a reduction in capital productivity across sectors", —that is, the output produced per unit of capital input. Reducing the productivity of capital as a result of climate change represents a need for firms to spend more on capital to achieve the same amount of output in every period. This effectively acts as depreciation and diverts investment from otherwise productive applications.

Accounting for capital damages in this way represents a departure from existing economic impact modelling and integrated assessments of climate change. In some cases, capital damages are included but at a highly aggregated level that limits regional analysis. Often, reports discuss the exposure or risk of geographies to capital damages but do not attempt to monetise an impact.

The methodology used in this report employs data produced by XDI modelling of climate change impacts on Australia's physical capital stock.[51] Global databases monetising climate induced capital damages are uncommon and those that exist are difficult to integrate into an IAM framework. As a result, Australia-specific data is used to infer capital damages in other regions, including New Zealand, through a process of climate matching, controlling for key regional differences such as physical capital density and distribution.

The XDI data provides estimates for total technical insurance premiums at the LGA level – akin to a monetised capital damage by LGA. These LGAs are subsequently categorised by key climatic characteristics, including temperature and precipitation, to form several sub-groupings. The categorisation of LGAs is largely informed by climate maps produced by the Australian Building Codes Board and are derived from climate data published by the Australian Bureau of Meteorology.

Data on climate characteristics (average temperature, precipitation, etc.) are then gathered for each country or region within Asia Pacific. Drawing on this data and an updated Köppen-Geiger climate classification map (a concept frequently applied in climate research), each of the countries and regions within Asia Pacific are categorised into comparable climate groups based on the Australian LGAs.

A log-log model (a particular form of an econometric regression model) is produced for each country drawing on data for Australian LGAs with similar climatic characteristics and predicted global mean average temperature increases under an RCP 6.0 emissions pathway. This regression controls for differences in physical capital density across LGAs. The estimated damages produced by this research can be interpreted as a percentage of annual capital investment that is diverted to repair and replace damaged assets due to an associated rise in average temperature in a region.

Estimated capital damages are produced at a country level and are aggregated to focus regions using regional shares of capital stock, proxied by population distribution.

2.5.8 Agricultural damages from changes in crop yields

Climate change will see rising temperatures, higher concentrations of CO_2 in the atmosphere, and different regional patterns of precipitation.[52] These factors all affect crop yields and agricultural productivity.

The effects of climate change on agricultural productivity are one of the most studied areas of climate change impacts. Yet, despite the many existing studies and the extensive empirical evidence, it is still difficult to identify a "consensus" on the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity. There are many factors at play, including the role of adaptation behaviour by farmers, firms and organisations, including variety selection, crop rotation, sowing times, the amount of fertilisation due to higher CO_2 concentration, the actual level of water available for irrigation, and irrigation techniques.[53]

Modelling the economic consequences of yield changes to understand the consequences of climate change impacts on agriculture is important for two main reasons. First, varying levels of agronomic and economic adaptation exist in the agricultural sector; farmers can adjust how they grow a particular crop, the location and timing of crop growth will shift in response to climate change impacts; trade in agricultural commodities will adjust; and consumers will be able to substitute goods as prices adjust.[54] Each of these adaptive responses will mediate the impacts of yield changes. Second, climate change impacts will vary by crop and by region, changing the comparative advantage of countries, and creating winners and losers in global agricultural markets.[55]

The approach undertaken in this analysis provides an estimate of productivity changes for the whole agricultural sector across the modelled regions. The methodology is based on Mendelsohn and Schlesinger (1999) and Cline (2007), where the variation in output per hectare is expressed as a function of temperature, precipitation, and CO_2 concentration.[56]

One disadvantage of this approach is that adaptation is not incorporated within the function. Studies that include an agronomic adaptation do, on average, report higher yields than those that don't; however, recent research has noted that the effects of agronomic, on-farm, within-crop adaptations (principally changes in crop variety and planting date) are small and statistically insignificant.[57] Additional economic adaptations such as crop switching, increasing production intensity, substituting consumption, or adjusting trade relationships are captured within the CGE model.

A further constraint of this approach to note is that the methodology is not as thorough as the Agricultural Model Inter-Comparison Project (AgMIP). AgMIP has used both partial and general equilibrium models to examine the economic implications of climate-induced yield shocks, determined using a number of process-based crop models (Nelson et al., 2014). Modelling based on AgMIP explicitly accounts for regional variation resulting from soil type, irrigation, baseline temperature, and nutrient limitations.

2.5.9 Tourism damages to net inflow of foreign currency

Climate-induced economic tourism damages are driven by changes in net visitor flows and expenditure. In D.Climate, changes to net visitor flows and expenditure are fundamentally driven by the exposure of each region to climate change. However, the impacts can be varied. Countries with lower current temperatures can experience a beneficial net inflow of foreign currency as temperatures rise and tourism increases in the region. Conversely, for countries with high current temperatures, further temperature rises mean the economy could experience a net outflow of foreign currency as tourism spending is reallocated to other regions.

The functional relationship of the tourism damages means that in a region, there is a point where rising temperatures reach a threshold, and the relationship between temperature and net flow of foreign currency switches from a net inflow to a net outflow.

To estimate tourism damages in D.Climate, functions that relate visitor arrivals and departures to average temperature are employed. These functions are consistent with those employed by Roson and Sartori (2016) and are derived from econometric models expressed in terms of land area, average temperature, length of coastline, per capita income, and the number of countries with shared land borders.[58]

This approach yields global parameters that are assumed consistent with New Zealand, Australia and Asia Pacific. Forecast average temperatures from MAGICC are used as inputs to these functions to determine a resulting net flow of foreign currency. The forecast net flow of foreign currency is subsequently apportioned to the appropriate industry based on a 35%, 30% and 35% split across trade, transport and services respectively.

The magnitude and persistence of tourism damages are also a function of the economic structure of each region's economy. Regions with more diverse economic structures are less likely to experience persistent economic damages as industries are less reliant on tourism and more malleable/adaptable.

3 Policy scenario

3.1 Emissions abatement drivers: Scenario inputs and assumptions

A number of high-level emissions abatement drivers are included to reflect a possible path to global net zero by 2050. A summary of the differences between the baseline/inadequate action and policy scenarios is presented in table 3.1. Note that the policy scenario does not model in detail the current policies in New Zealand, but a set of drivers that enable New Zealand and the world to rapidly reach net zero by 2050.

Table 3.1. Summary of emissions pathways and drivers in both scenarios

Scenario	Drivers
Baseline (3°C world)	• SSP2-4.5 emissions pathway, reflecting global inadequate action on climate change mitigation • 3°C of warming and a range of climate damages by region and industry
Policy (1.5°C world)	• SSP1-1.9 emissions pathway, reflecting significant global climate action • 1.5°C of warming and "locked-in" climate damages • Global economy emits net-zero emissions in 2050 • Productivity improvements to clean electricity driven by cost reductions to renewable energy in excess of those in the base case • Transition assistance by governments and the private sector to support industries and regions that face higher transition costs

Source: Deloitte Economics.

There are four steps implemented in the policy scenario: an emissions price, "locked-in" climate damages in a close-to-1.5°C world, clean electricity productivity improvements, and transition assistance.

3.1.1 Emissions price

The transition to a low-carbon economy has been modelled as one in which policymakers set clear and ambitious targets. We selected paths for prices on emissions that resulted in an emissions pathway over the next 30 years in a way that roughly aligns with the SSP1-1.9 scenario.

An emissions price means processes that have associated emissions — like the combustion of coal to produce electricity — become more expensive. Those processes that do not have associated emissions—such as the generation of electricity from renewables—do not face this price increase. Emissions which aren't a function of fuel choice (like fugitive emissions in agriculture) are also subject to the emissions price, reflecting likely policy choices to further induce and incentivise reductions in emissions through changes in production processes.

Relative price changes like these lead to changes in behaviour, such as switching from fossil fuel-based electricity generation to renewables. As these changes aren't seamless, the combined effect of them is to impose an aggregate cost on each economy. This isn't the same as a legislated carbon tax, or a traded emissions price, but it is analogous in that it represents the projected price at which a given reduction in emissions can be achieved.

The process described above is the first of two steps in the policy simulation. The second step involves the introduction of learning rate-based productivity improvements for renewables, hydrogen and bio-energy.

For example, the case for cost reductions of zero emission fuel sources is based on the concept of learning by doing articulated first by Kenneth Arrow in 1962.[59] The first step of the simulation provides a guide to the potential uptake of each technology which is then used in determining the appropriate rate of productivity-induced cost reduction to impose.

There is a significant portion of the global and regional emissions inventory which can't be reduced through the kind of price-based switching described above. Examples include fugitive emissions from mining, industrial process emission from the production of cement and factor-based emissions from livestock farming. These emissions will need to be removed through changes in production processes like, for example, the adoption of methane reducing feed additivities for livestock. These changes will not be costless, but there is inherent uncertainty regarding how these processes will be developed and what each will cost. Simulating the policy scenario in two steps allows for the projection of when process improvements become economically viable.

3.1.2 Locked-in climate damages under a close-to-1.5°C world

The combined effect of warming driven by historical emissions already in the atmosphere and the amount that will be emitted under the emissions path described in 3.1.1, means that some amount of climate damage is unavoidable. This is incorporated into the 1.5°C world scenario.

One component of the benefits of climate action in the close-to-1.5°C world scenario is the avoided damage—the difference between damages under a 3°C world and a close-to-1.5°C world.

3.1.3 Clean electricity productivity improvements

Projections of reductions to the levelised cost of electricity to 2050 for wind and solar, combined with the rising share of wind and solar in clean electricity sector generation (different shares in the baseline and net-zero scenarios) will drive cost reductions per unit of outputs.[60] A share of this productivity improvement to these technologies is included in the 3°C world scenario, reflecting the fact that these cost reductions will likely continue irrespective of policy, driven by learning by doing, economies of scale, and supply chain efficiencies.[61] An incremental productivity improvement driven by policy is included in the close-to-1.5°C world scenario, reflecting the fact that the share of solar and wind in electricity production will grow more rapidly, lowering production costs within this industry.

3.1.4 Transition assistance

The policy scenario incorporates coordinated private sector and government investment to offset structural adjustment costs in industries and regions as decarbonisation accelerates. Coordinated transition assistance reflects economic and regulatory settings that create new economic activity for economies to transition into —I n general, targeted to industries that policy makers have already signalled as likely to receive assistance as the New Zealand economy decarbonises .

This means coordinated effort does not generally go toward emissions-intensive conventional energy sectors, as they primarily respond to price and changing demand. For example, transition assistance is targeted to diversify economic activity into areas such as construction, agriculture and transport. This smooths the structural disruption to economies and their workforces, resulting in increased job creation earlier in the phases of decarbonisation.

A failure to provide coordinated transition assistance increases the cost of the transition for industry, and most significantly for those employed in those industries. There are no new or emerging job opportunities for workers to transition into, resulting in reduced job creation and significant dislocation for workforces, particularly in some regions. Transition assistance is necessarily simplified in the modelling.

4 Discounting the future

It is inherently difficult to “discount” the future, particularly concerning an issue as socially and economically complex as global climate change.

In considering this issue, it is important to recognise the intergenerational impact of climate change on society and in doing so, how to value “income,” “consumption,” “utility,” or “well-being” at one point in time relative to another. In comparing these conditions across generations, the discount rate must reflect a preference for short-term consumption over the long term and the opportunity cost of saving.

In determining the rate, the question is, ‘What rate is appropriate to embody these preferences in estimating the net present value of impacts to economies and societies from climate change and various climate-change policy responses?’[62]

GHG emissions have a long residence time in the atmosphere, which means that the value of the impacts of today’s emissions must be considered for future generations. Equally, policy responses regarding mitigation and adaptation to altered climatic conditions impact future generations significantly.

In this context:[63]

- The use of a “high discount rate” implies that society puts less weight on future impacts and therefore less emphasis on guarding against such future costs.
- The use of a “low discount rate” highlights the importance of future generations’ well-being.[64] Society should act now to protect future generations from climate change impacts.

A discount rate of 2% has been used by Deloitte Economics in this analysis, after considering the differing perspectives within literature, the economic framework adopted for analysis in D.Climate, and broader policy actions modeled.[65] This rate reflects a view consistent with social discounting in other climate change economic analyses.

Further, the results of a survey of economists in the American Economic Journal: Economic Policy (the sample contains more than 200 academics defined as experts on social discounting by virtue of their publications) indicates that most favor a low discount rate, with more than 75% comfortable with a median discount rate of 2%.[66]

5 Limitations

Modelling the full physical consequences of climate change on the global economic system and the economic impacts of mitigation and adaptation pathways can be challenging, however is not insurmountable. The approach outlined in this paper provides a detailed view of the literature and science that underpins our analysis. There nevertheless remain many uncertainties, technical limitations, and areas of future research that will benefit from recognition and separate discussion.

Deloitte Economics recognises that there are legitimate critiques and limitations of IAMs, as well as the complexity involved in determining relationships between GHG emissions, global surface temperature, and economic impacts.[67] But equally we recognise that such a framework can provide useful insights for policymakers who are making a choice today that will have far-reaching consequences. We should not discount the pragmatic in pursuit of the perfect. There is value that these frameworks provide in their capacity to consistently model such complex relationships, policies, and technologies.[68] Our approach is to incrementally improve and build upon previously identified limitations in these modeling frameworks, rather than dispensing with their use altogether.

In particular, a key area of earlier criticism — the damage function — has benefited from a rapidly expanding econometric literature, which has enabled the parameterisation of plausibly causal relationships that more accurately capture relationships between climate and the economy.[69] We have incorporated these into a more disaggregated, multi-sectoral view of damages and have updated damage estimates based on more recently available science and research.[70] For example, a number of our damage functions reflect a core finding that temperature increases have a nonlinear relationship with economic outcomes.[71] We nevertheless recognise there are a range of impact channels that are not explicitly modelled here. In this sense, this work can be considered a conservative estimate of impacts, and ongoing model development will look to incorporate these channels over time. A selection of these includes:

- Individual natural disasters and extreme events[72]
- Changes in household energy demand[73]
- Water availability[74]
- Crime and other social impacts[75]
- Ocean acidification[76]

An extensive literature focuses on climatic nonlinearities that are not captured in this framework. Within climate-economic modelling, the most renowned argument for considering these impacts is made by Martin Weitzman.[77] These "tipping points" include events such as the partial disintegration of ice sheets, biosphere collapses, or permafrost loss that pose a threat of abrupt and irreversible climate change. Positively, the 2021 IPCC report argues that there is growing confidence that taking action to reduce emissions will significantly lower the likelihood of certain tipping points being reached.[78] AR5 was more pessimistic about the range of tipping points that are at risk of being crossed regardless of abatement and mitigation action. Once again, given these uncertainties, we consider our analysis of primarily chronic impacts of warming to underestimate the potential future damages of climate change.

It should be noted D.Climate model does not take a probabilistic approach to the baseline and net-zero scenarios. Rather, it models narrow economic impacts that relate to specific damage functions from the selected emission pathways, without assigning probability to the outcome. This approach is to inform a better framework for decision-making today, based on orders of magnitude of economic trade-offs over time.

Economic modelling of climate impacts is not only interested in the direct effects of climate outcomes on physical spaces, but also the behavioural responses that occur in response to those changes.[79] These can variously be referred to as adaptation responses.[80] D.Climate considers adaptation in two main ways:

1. The damage functions are informed by empirical relationships that reflect long-term, ongoing adaption processes that are already embedded in underlying data.
2. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) component of the model captures decision-making by firms and households that are able to switch between consumption sets and inputs based on relative prices and productivity changes in the economy. This flexible switching is akin to adaptation.

There will be some adaptation that is not able to be explicitly modeled; in particular, adaptation that seeks to reduce the marginal damage caused by warming beyond that which is already captured by the damage function parameters (e.g., the building of sea walls or other technological change). The advantage of the D.Climate approach is that some adaptation and dynamic economic change does take place in response to a changing climate, which improves upon approaches that project historical patterns forward. Improving the ability of the model to account for a wider range of adaptive responses is the focus of ongoing work.

6 Appendix

Sector name	Abbreviation	GTAP sector
Plants	PLANTS	Paddy rice
		Wheat
		Cereal grains
		Vegetables, fruit, nuts
		Oil seeds
		Sugar cane, sugar beet
		Plant-based fibres
		Other crops
Dairy cattle	DAIRYCATTLE	Raw milk
Fishing	FISHING	Fishing
Other animals	OTHERANIMALS	Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses
		Wool, silk-worm cocoons
		Other animal products
Forestry	FORESTRY	Forestry
Meat manufacturing	MEATMAN	Bovine meat products
		Other meat products
Dairy processing	DAIRY	Dairy products
Other food manufacturing	OTHERFOODMAN	Vegetable oils, fats
		Processed rice
		Sugar
		Food products
		Beverages, tobacco products
Light manufacturing	LIGHTMAN	Textiles
		Wearing apparel

Sector name	Abbreviation	GTAP sector
		Leather products
		Wood products
		Paper products, publishing
Coal	COAL	Coal
Oil	OIL	Oil
Gas	GAS	Gas
Other mining	OMIN	Other mining
Hydrogen	HYD	Petroleum, coal products*
Bioenergy (carbon-neutral)	BIO	Petroleum, coal products*
Petroleum, coal products	P_C	Petroleum, coal products
Heavy manufacturing	HEAVYMAN	Chemical products
		Basic pharmaceutical products
		Rubber and plastic products
		Mineral products
		Ferrous metals
		Metals
		Metal products
		Computer, electronic, and optical products
		Electrical equipment
		Machinery, equipment
		Motor vehicles and parts
		Transport equipment
		Other manufactured goods
Electricity transmission and distribution	ELYTND	Electricity transmission and distribution
Conventional electricity	ELYTHERM	Coal base load

Sector name	Abbreviation	GTAP sector
		Gas base load
		Oil base load
		Other base load
		Gas peak load
		Oil peak load
Emissions free electricity	ELYCLEAN	Nuclear base load (in regions outside of Nev Zealand)
		Wind base load
		Hydro base load
		Hydro peak load
		Solar peak load
Gas manufacture and distribution	GDT	Gas manufacture, distribution
Water	WATER	Water
Construction	CONS	Construction
Retail trade and tourism	TRADE	Trade
		Accommodation, food and service activities
Transport	TRANS	Transport
		Water transport
		Air transport
		Warehousing and support activities
Other services	OSERV	Communication
		Financial services
		Insurance
		Real estate activities
		Business services
		Recreational and other services

Sector name	Abbreviation	GTAP sector
		Dwellings
Government services	GOVSERV	Public administration and defense
		Education
		Human health and social work activities

Note: *The hydrogen and bioenergy sectors are not identified as individual sectors in the GTAP database but have instead been distinctly separated from the petroleum and coal products sector. An explanation of this process is provided in the following section.
Source: Deloitte Economics analysis of GTAP database.

Endnotes

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